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Thematic Report

In Their Eyes

The perception of aid and humanitarian workers by irregular combatants in the Democratic Republic of Congo

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(Cover photo: Mai Mai combatants in South Kivu © Justine Brabant 2013)

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Executive Summary

Context

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) hasn't experienced real peace for two decades. The conflicts that have affected the East of the country have given rise to a major humanitarian crisis, involving over 200 national and international NGOs in the North and South Kivu provinces today.

Access by NGOs to their intervention areas varies: although the DRC may not be as dangerous for humanitarian workers and expatriates as, for example, Somalia or Afghanistan, its provinces pose some specific problems relating to the multitude of armed groups operating in the area, shifting alliances and overlapping local and regional conflicts.

This study attempts to understand how humanitarian workers are perceived by irregular combatants in Eastern DRC and to identify situations that may lead to incidents targeting them. The study also offers a brief analysis of how humanitarian workers themselves think they are perceived by the armed groups and how they interact with them.

Methodology

This study is based mainly on a field survey conducted over a two-and-a-half-month period, in North and South Kivu (75 interviews, 41 of which were semi-structured, involving members of 15 different armed groups) and on analysing feedback from a questionnaire given to NGO representatives operating in North and South Kivu (45 participants, mostly Heads of Mission and/or security officers).

Main Conclusions

Perception of armed groups by humanitarian workers: apart from the variety of the opinions given by the NGO representatives interviewed, one of the main findings of the study is that a number of fairly important NGOs state that they have never made contact with any armed groups, even when the latter are heavily present in their area of intervention.

Perception of humanitarian workers by armed groups: members of the armed groups encountered generally seemed to be mindful of appearing to be respectful of the physical integrity of humanitarian workers, their principles and International Humanitarian Law (IHL). They also appeared to have a good overall understanding of these principles, albeit with some erroneous interpretations of how they apply and a sometimes patchy knowledge of the differences between the various aid workers (NGOs, UN and governmental agencies).

However, although the presence of humanitarian agencies is always deemed necessary and welcome and the work carried out by NGOs is generally understood in principle, the members of armed groups interviewed almost systematically followed up positive views with fairly precise criticism aimed at the organisations operating in their area. Criticism is most often aimed at supposed incompetence of the NGOs (poor quality of equipment or services), recruitment methods (often based on patronage or family ties), embezzlement of funds by NGO employees and failing to consult with the local population, which often leads to the implementation of ill-suited programmes. These criticisms often go hand in hand with suspicion of partiality or spying by certain organisations.

Such views are not held by all the combatants interviewed: some of them are critical about the supposed "political" behaviour of some NGOs (partiality, spying), whilst others focus more on highlighting technical problems (incompetence, programmes ill-adapted to local needs, etc.). This divergence of opinions is influenced by the identity of the armed groups that the interviewee belongs to, the role of the combatant – rank, function – within their armed groups and their own personal background.

Main recommendations

On the basis of these analyses, the authors hereby propose a few suggestions to organisation officials aimed at maintaining contact with armed groups:

- *Secure communication* with group representatives; verifying the identity of all interlocutors;

- *Send a uniform image to all players involved in the conflict*, in particular by not trying to conceal any contact they may have with other groups or communities deemed as "adversaries" (this leads to suspicion of spying or playing a double game);

- *Avoid establishing too personalised contacts with armed groups*: maintaining very personal contacts with members of armed groups (based, for example, on the geographical origin of an employee, which may afford him or her easier access) may be both very positive and yet highly risky for the employee concerned and for the NGO. Ways of helping to reduce this tendency to personalise contacts include: assigning a "secure" telephone number that is different from the personal number of the person covering the role of security officer; establishing an effective system of "hand-over"; limiting occasions where agents have to meet armed groups representatives on their own, for example, by ensuring agents work in pairs when going on delicate assignments;

- *Don't ignore the "rank-and-file"*: the study shows that good contact with a commander or spokesperson of an armed group is not always enough to ensure safe access. Humanitarian principles should be clear enough for even ordinary combatants to understand them (display stickers on vehicles; translate HQ "codes of conduct" into French and Swahili; take time to speak with those manning checkpoints, spread awareness through beneficiaries, etc.);

- *Manage breeches of humanitarian and operational principles:* risks encountered (or felt) by NGO agents sometimes lead them to waive certain principles; e.g., supplying material or financial aid to armed men. Incidents like these should not be ignored. Instead, internal mechanisms should be put in place for agents concerned to be able to report safely (without being afraid of possible disciplinary measures) incidents and the latter should be dealt with swiftly and publicly so as to prevent them from becoming the norm, which could make them become detrimental to the organisation concerned or to the humanitarian community as a whole.

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1. Introduction

What do members of armed groups think of humanitarian workers? What do they know about non-governmental organisations (NGOs) operating in their area? Do they appreciate or dislike them? Do they bring welcome aid or are they seen as just another potential target? Do they understand what aid workers do, what their principles are and do they even distinguish them from other types of organisations (UN, bilateral cooperation, associations, etc.)?

These are just some of the many questions that are seldom asked but which are particularly important in areas of conflict in general and in the Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in particular, where humanitarian workers and armed groups have coexisted for two decades and where frequent political and military developments pose a constant challenge to mutual understanding between aid workers and armed men. The aim of this study by INSO, with the support of ECHO, is to propose some hints to find possible answers to these questions.

Conflicts in Kivu: a difficult context to understand but a relatively accessible terrain

Eastern DRC hasn't experienced real peace for two decades: the so-called "Masisi" war in 1993; the hunt for genocide perpetrators and Rwandan refugees by Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) troops on Zairian territory (1994-1995); the "first" and "second" Congolese wars (1996-1997, 1998-2003) and the subsequent tensions leading up to the creation of the National Congress for the Defence of the People (NCDP) in July 2006 and the creation of the M23 Movement on 23 March 2012 (hence M23). There has also been continued presence of foreign rebels, such as the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)[1], for over ten years.

These conflicts, as well as their varying phases of intensity, have not only given rise to numerous humanitarian crises in the DRC, they have further undermined the country's already weak structural development in general – it was ranked last in the Human Development Index (HDI) in 2012 in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). According to estimates by the UN's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), North and South Kivu provinces have 1.6 million internally displaced people (IDPs).

This has led to a growing influx of NGOs into Eastern DRC, providing aid relating to health, education, water, hygiene and sanitation, protection, food safety, emergency shelter and Non-Food Items (NFI). Altogether, around 200 national and international active NGOs were registered in North and South Kivu in 2013[2].

Access by Humanitarian NGOs to their respective areas of intervention varies. Although humanitarian aid has always been hampered by a number of incidents throughout the conflict (the serious incident aimed at humanitarian workers in April 2001 in Ituri is proof of this), Eastern DRC has never been as dangerous for humanitarian workers and expatriates as, for example, Somalia or Afghanistan.

It is not so much that humanitarian workers have been specifically and deliberately targeted on a regular basis; the main difficulty for aid workers in Eastern DRC appears to be the "complexity" of their context of intervention. The conflicts in the area are characterised by the sheer multitude of armed groups involved in the conflict (state and non-state, national and foreign); shifting alliances, overlapping local issues (relating to access to land or to identity-based conflicts and traditional power, in particular) and international issues (regarding the return of refugees and the presence on Congolese territory of armed groups backed by foreign powers).

1 See Prunier, Gérard (2009): *Africa's First world war. Congo, the Rwandan Genocide and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press & Stearns, Jason (2010): *Dancing in the Glory of Monsters. The Collapse of the Congo and the Great War of Africa*. New York: Public Affairs, for a background on these conflicts.

2 Exact figures are difficult to obtain due to an amount of fluctuation and because certain NGOs operate in both provinces.

Incidents targeting humanitarian workers in the Kivu provinces

What incidents are NGOs operating in the Kivu provinces really exposed to and are some areas more problematic than others? INSO records of incidents aimed at NGOs since September 2012 provide us with an initial response to these questions. The table below gives an overview of the number of incidents by territory from September 2012 to the end of November 2013:

Territory	**Number of humanitarian organisations[3] (NK 01/13 and SK 07/13)**	**Number of incidents targeting NGOs[4] (September 2012 - November 2013).**	**Coefficient (1.0 = one incident per organisation)**
NORTH KIVU			
Beni	46	5	0.11
Lubero	49	12	0.25
Masisi	31	36	1.61
Nyiragongo	N/A	74	N/A
Rutshuru	46	52	1.13
Walikale	22	7	0.32
Sub-total	***87[5]***	***186***	***2.14***
SOUTH KIVU			
Fizi	43	16	0.37
Idjwi	17	1	0.06
Kabare	55	23	0.42
Kalehe	57	19	0.33
Mwenga	43	3	0.07
Shabunda	28	19	0.68
Uvira	55	9	0.16
Walungu	41	5	0.12
Sub-total	***120[6]***	***95***	***0.79***
TOTAL	**207**	**281**	**1.36**

The data appears to indicate that North Kivu experiences more frequent safety incidents targeting humanitarian workers than South Kivu. In terms of territories, the ones located nearest to the town of Goma – Masisi, Nyiragongo and Rutshuru – seem to be amongst the most problematic. This high frequency of incidents cannot only be blamed on the wider presence of humanitarian workers in the area, because they don't only relate to the frequency of absolute incidents, but also to the number of incidents in relation to the number of organisations (see coefficients in the right hand column).

3 Figures taken from OCHA (2013): *Qui fait quoi où au Nord-Kivu ? (Who is doing what where in North Kivu?)* Kinshasa: United Nations and OCHA (2013): *Qui fait quoi où au Nord-Kivu ? (Who is doing what where in North Kivu?)* Kinshasa: United Nations. The figures include UN agencies.

4 Figures taken from INSO's database for the period September 2012 – November 2013. They do not include incidents aimed at UN agencies. They also cover incidents perpetrated by regular armies, irregular combatants, criminals and unidentified armed men.

5 The overall number is lower than the overall amount per territory because certain organisations are active in several territories, whilst others are not listed by OCHA (CICR for example appears in OCHA statistics for North Kivu but not for South Kivu.

6 Same as note above.

The overall figure of 1.36 incidents per NGO is to be taken with precaution because it includes different types of incidents (see INSO's bi-monthly reports for details). However, the data does give an indication of the situation for humanitarian workers operating in the East of the country. The real figure is probably higher because some NGOs are active in both provinces.

Finding out the reasons for these attacks is, of course, very important for humanitarian workers. In most cases, it is probable that the NGOs were targeted rather for economic reasons than for political reasons such as a negative perception of the NGO or its employees. However, such cases exist and new incidents act as an occasional reminder of the danger (for example, the assassination of seven local NGO employees attributed to Mai Mai Yakutumba in October 2011). This is why humanitarian workers need to know how they are perceived by the armed groups in the areas that they operate and, in particular, by irregular combatants, so that they can identify situations that may lead to future incidents or generally hamper their activities.

Why conduct a study on perception?

Attempts to clarify this complex context often suffer from high turnover in the humanitarian sector, which makes it difficult to establish a collective memory. Although academic research into the matter may be more refined in its method of analysis, it generally doesn't offer any applied strategy to humanitarian workers. Regarding the question of perception, in particular, several reports on the perception of humanitarian workers by beneficiaries have been published in the past few years by either the NGOs themselves or by academics[7]. However, up to now, very little has been written to date specifically concerning the perception of NGOs by the members of armed groups.

Thus, it is necessary to aim at better understanding how armed groups perceive humanitarian workers and organisation in order to pilot suitable strategies for access to areas controlled by armed groups.

This study aims, first and foremost, at providing possible answers to this question. It is based on extensive research in North and South Kivu; on previous research conducted by both authors and on the work by INSO in the area. Its main objective is to provide humanitarian partners with ways of analysing the situation and a toolbox to help fine-tune any eventual interaction and negotiation with irregular combatants.

To do so, the report is divided into four main sections. It starts with a brief overview of the main armed groups operating in Eastern DRC. This helps to establish an overview of the political and military situation that humanitarian workers are operating in. Section two is a systematic analysis of how the humanitarian workers perceive their position within the context of the conflict. The central section of the report focuses on the armed groups and on their perception of humanitarian workers. The last chapter tries to draw some key conclusions and to help generating suitable strategies to tackle the discovered challenges.

7 See Dijkzeul, Dennis and Iguma Wakenge, Claude (2010): *Doing good looking bad? Local perceptions of two humanitarian organisations in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo*, in: Disasters, Vol. 34, No. 4. London: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 1139–1170.

2. Main armed groups in North and South Kivu

Name[8]	Date Created	Main Location	Estimated Numbers
Allied Democratic Forces (ADF-NALU)	1995	Beni, (Ituri)	500 – 1000
Patriotic Alliance for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS)	2009	Masisi	800 – 1000
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR-FOCA)[9]	2001	Lubero, Masisi, Mwenga, Kalehe	1500 – 2500
Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC)[10]	2010	Lubero	300
Congolese Defence Force (FDC-Guides)	2011	Masisi	200
Front for the National Liberation (FNL)	2002	Uvira, Fizi	200 – 500
Mai Mai Kifuafua	2002	Kalehe, Walikale	200 – 300
Mai Mai Yakutumba / Party for Action and Reconstruction of Congo – Forces Armées Alleluiah (PARC-FAAL)	2007	Fizi	300
Congolese Movement for Change (MCC)	2011	Uvira	200
Action Movement for Change (MAC)[11]	2013	Masisi, Walikale	100
Defence Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MDLC)	2012	Uvira, Fizi	100 – 400
March 23 Movement (M23)[12]	2012	Rutshuru	400
Nduma Defence of Congo (NDC)/Mai Mai Cheka	2009	Walikale	200
Nyatura (Nyatura/FDDH/FDIPC/Vutura/FODP/MPA/Noheri)	2011	Masisi, Rutshuru	600 – 1200
Raia Mutomboki / Mukombozi (Shabunda)[13]	2010/3	Shabunda	400 – 1000
Raia Mutomboki (Kalehe/Bunyakiri)	2011	Kalehe	200 – 400
Raia Mutomboki (Walikale)	2011	Walikale	200 – 400
Union for the Rehabilitation of Democracy in Congo (URDC)	2013	Beni, Lubero	300
Other groups (incomplete list): Patriotic Resistance Front in Ituri (FRPI), Mai Mai Shetani, Mai Mai Morgan, Mai Mai Nyakiliba, Bakata Katanga/CORAK, Mai Mai Fujo, Local Defence/FALL, Mai Mai Kirikicho, Tawimbi, Muhima Nkingi group. In the last quarter of 2013, the total number of non-state armed groups was estimated at between 50 and 60 groups[14].			

8 Information relating to the overall situation of these groups in early November 2013. Detailed information on each group is available in the appendix, with mention of sources used.
9 The dissident factions of FDLR, FDLR-Soki in Rutshuru and RUD-Urunana in Lubero, are mentioned in the appendix.
10 Combined with the URDC in the details in the appendix.
11 Splinter group from FDC-Guides created in 2011, combined with FDC in details in appendix.
12 Movement that officially laid down its arms in November 2013.
13 The Raia Mutomboki Jean Musumbu group (active in the South of the Shabunda territory), created in 2005, has been virtually inactive since 2013. For further details, see appendix.
14 See also Vogel, Christoph (2013): *Mapping armed groups in eastern Congo* (www.christophvogel.net/mapping).

3. Perception of armed groups by humanitarian workers in North and South Kivu

To understand how humanitarian workers themselves perceive and interact with the armed groups operating in their areas of intervention, a questionnaire was sent to all partner organisations of INSO.

Methodology used for the NGO survey

45 NGO officials[15] operating in North and South Kivu agreed to respond to a questionnaire designed by the consultants (in agreement with INSO's DRC office). The questionnaire covered the political and military situation in the intervention areas of these NGOs; their safety policy and how they interact with the armed groups.

Most participants – who all replied by email – were either Heads of Mission or security officers. Around 80% of the respondents were international NGO employees and the remaining 20% were national NGO employees.

The analysis of these questionnaires was in some cases completed by face-to-face interviews.

The main conclusions that can be drawn from this survey are as follows:

- Knowledge of the armed groups operating in the area of operation by these NGO officials is variable. It goes from very detailed to scant (groups mistaken for others, wrong names, hasty generalisation regarding combatants, as reflected in the following statement):

  "Most armed groups are ignorant, illiterate, drunkards, greedy, like looting" (interview with NGO n°5 – International NGO Head of Mission)

- In response to the question whether armed groups understood their *humanitarian guideline principles* and International Humanitarian Law (IHL), the NGO officials interviewed again gave varying responses:

  "Since they are involved in a guerrilla war, the armed groups ignore humanitarian principles" (interview with NGO n°15)".

  "Armed groups don't know about humanitarian principles" (interview with NGO n°4)

  "Armed groups have a good understanding of humanitarian principles in the intervention areas because they always let NGOs pass through. We are allowed to work in areas controlled by armed groups and we have contacts with their leaders to get access" (interview with NGO n°25).

  "All the commanders are conversant with humanitarian principles and International Humanitarian Law. In the case of their "foot soldiers", it depends on the circumstances" (interview with NGO n°37).

  This range of answers somehow reflects the variety of armed groups present in the East, but also reveals an amount of uncertainty by the NGOs themselves, regarding the definition of humanitarian principles – some answers indicate that the difference between humanitarian principles and International Humanitarian Law is not always one hundred percent clear.

  The survey also shows that the judgement of the interviewees regarding International Humanitarian Law and/or humanitarian principles is often relational ("group A understands them more than group B") and varies considerably within the humanitarian community (different NGOs attributing different levels of understanding of the principles within one same armed group).

15 Mainly Heads of Mission and security officers.

- Regarding humanitarian principles, the survey participants tend to believe that the more formal the structure of the group was (such as M23, FDLR and, to some extent, APCLS or NDC), the more accustomed they were to humanitarian principles. Quite logically, they estimated that the higher up the ranking the members were, the more aware they were of humanitarian principles:

  > "Armed groups in Masisi don't understand humanitarian principles but M23 does" (interview with NGO n°7)

  > "FDLR leaders know International Humanitarian Law quite well; APCLS less so and some Nyatura and R[aia] M[utomboki] are completely oblivious of it" (interview with NGO n°21)

- Regarding whether the security situation influenced their recruitment policy, it is interesting to note that most humanitarian workers interviewed spontaneously focused their answer on the ethnic origin of their staff (questions relating to gender or nationality were rarely mentioned). Most of them stated that they didn't recruit on ethnic grounds (this was confirmed by the armed groups themselves, who often reproached NGOs for not recruiting locally – see section 4 of this report), as reflected by this explanation given by a Head of Mission:

  > "We refuse to recruit on ethnic grounds on principle – because we refuse sectarian community and thus 'deadly' identities, which itself may lead to conflict" (interview with NGO n°9).

However, some NGOs say it is important to maintain a degree of balance and to try to reflect the different communities present in the area of operation. This seems to be particularly true in Masisi (North Kivu) and in Kalehe and Fizi (South Kivu) territories, where recent tensions have led to some organisations having to review their recruitment policy:

> "We try to maintain a degree of ethnic and gender balance in our teams. However, this doesn't mean that we won't choose a potentially good member of staff [simply because he comes] from an area of intervention. Our local partners sometimes choose their researchers in function of their ethnic origin if this makes it easier to operate in certain areas" (interview with NGO n°2).

> "In South Kivu, the Banyamulenge staff cannot be sent everywhere" (interview with NGO n°8).

> "Some employees are recruited locally but most of them come from other regions of DRC. In Kitchanga, the ethnic factor plays a major role in recruitment, following the tensions [of] mid-2013" (interview with NGO n°36).

> "[We encounter] huge difficulties [in relation to] the Nyatura because no member of staff is a Hutu" (interview with NGO n°4).

> "Sometimes, recruitment is affected by a potential risk posed to a population in certain areas. For example, in areas controlled by Raia Mutomboki, the NGO pays particular attention to the ethnic origin of its staff" (interview with NGO n°21).

- Regarding attacks aimed at NGOs, not many serious incidents were mentioned in the questionnaires. However, there was a high number of incidents of so-called "tracasserie".
- Some interviewees said they had been accused of spying or showing partiality (showing support or sympathy towards armed groups or communities considered as "adversaries", which often, albeit not systematically, reflects ethnic tensions):

  > "In Bunyakiri, a politician accused one NGO of preparing to relocate 50 000 Tutsi families" (interview with NGO n°4).

  > "[We were] accused of spying simply because [we have] a post box in Gisenyi [Rwanda]" (interview with NGO n°11).

The next section of this study will be giving an overview followed by an in-depth analysis of how accusations of spying and partiality come about in relation to the armed groups interviewed.

- It has also been found that a large number of NGOs claimed they never had any contact with the armed groups, even when the latter were heavily present in their area of intervention. In some cases, there was a deliberate choice to avoid meeting with groups ("We avoid all contact with armed groups"– interview with NGO n°22). Others said they didn't feel they had the necessary skills and knowledge or that there were technical obstacles preventing them from doing so (groups present in areas not covered by the mobile network; commanders changing their telephone number all too frequently; mobility of the groups, which made it difficult to identify the right contacts, …):

  > "The main challenge is the lack of knowledge about armed groups in some complex areas. This makes us wary of engaging with them" (interview with NGO n°19).

- Even when the NGOs decided to establish contacts with the armed groups and were logistically prepared to do so, the groups sometimes refused any meetings. Judging from those surveyed, certain political and military developments also dissuaded some groups from responding to requests for contact from NGOs:

  > "[Due to the presence] of the MONUSCO Intervention Brigade, many armed groups are wary of establishing contact [with us]" (interview with NGO n°36).

4. Perception of humanitarian work by armed groups

This section is the result of a survey conducted among armed groups present in North and South Kivu from October to December 2013 (see methodology box below and appendix II for further details). It is also based on previous research conducted by the authors on armed groups operating in the North and South Kivu provinces.

The survey shows that most members of the armed groups interviewed consider the presence of humanitarian organisations as necessary and welcome and that they generally understand, however sometimes only partially, the principles governing humanitarian action and the basis of International Humanitarian Law. However, it also shows that they are very critical of the projects and organisations that they know best and encounter directly in their areas of control. Some aspects of these criticisms also show that despite their basic understanding of humanitarian principles, these principles are often misinterpreted: e.g., accusing certain NGOs of being "partial" simply because they do not provide aid to all the ethnic groups in a given area – even though these organisations may have provided aid to the communities based on need as opposed to ethnic grounds.

This part of the report presents a detailed picture of the types of criticism and suspicion aimed at NGOs and their employees and then proposes a systematic analysis of the factors that determine the perceptions and attitudes towards humanitarian workers, in order to enable NGOs active in North and South Kivu to conduct their own analysis based on their own specific context of intervention.

Methodology of the survey conducted on armed groups

The following conclusions are based on a survey conducted from 15 October to 15 December 2013 in territories located in North and South Kivu. 75 interviews were conducted on members of 15 different armed groups, 41 of which were of a semi-structured nature (see interview guide in the appendix). The range of interviewees surveyed was chosen to obtain the widest range possible in terms of geographical area covered, type of groups (degree of organisation, number of members, etc.) and rank and profiles of those interviewed ("rank-and-file", top commanders, military personnel and political representatives, etc.). Focus was also turned to little known groups and/or groups identified by INSO as possible sources of difficulty for humanitarian workers (e.g., Raia Mutomboki and Mukombozi in Shabunda and Kalehe territories).

List of the armed groups contacted, by territory:

- *Uvira territory:* Mai Mai Fujo, MDP (ex Mai Mai Baleke), MDLC (coalition of Bafulero Mai Mai) and close relations to Mai Mai Bede;
- *Fizi territory*: PARC-FAAL (Mai Mai Yakutumba), Mai Mai Mulumba, Biloze Bishambuke;
- *Walungu territory*: Raia Mukombozi (Nyanderema branch);
- *Shabunda territory*: Raia Mukombozi (Donat/Ngandu branch), Raia Mukombozi coalition (Foka Mike/Meshe branch, Maheshe branch);
- *Kalehe territory*: Raia Mutomboki (Hamakombo branch);
- *Bukavu*: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR);
- *Masisi territory:* APCLS, FDDH/Nyatura, FDLR;
- *Walikale territory*: Nduma Defence of Congo (NDC/Mai Mai Cheka).

Despite its political and military weight at the time of reporting, M23 could not be included in the study, due to on-going clashes that it was involved in during the survey, which had made access to them difficult. Despite ADF-Nalu's capacity to inflict damage, which makes it an important group to be reckoned with, it, too, is not included in the study, because the safety conditions of the researchers could not be guaranteed.

4.1 Aid generally "well seen"

Overall, members of the armed groups encountered generally seemed to be mindful of appearing to be respectful of the physical integrity of humanitarian workers, humanitarian principles and International Humanitarian Law. They also appeared to have a good overall grasp of the principles, albeit with some erroneous interpretations of application and despite a sometimes patchy knowledge of the differences between the various aid workers (NGOs, UN and government agencies).

4.1.1 "We want NGOs"

None of the groups surveyed said they were principally hostile towards the presence of NGOs in their area of control. It is possible that such comforting statements came about only due to the interview situation itself, with the surveyed trying to responded in the way they thought their interviewer expected them to. As it happens, the image of INSO as an NGO and of the interviewer as a *muzungu* (white-skinned) may have led them to put a generally more positive "spin" on how they responded[16].

However, a number of factors would suggest that this overall positive opinion expressed was not made up solely to please interviewers. Firstly, similar opinions were expressed when interviewed by Congolese research assistants with no institutional links to the world of NGOs. Secondly, the same members of armed groups who said they were in favour of the presence of humanitarian agencies did not hesitate to express strong criticism of some organisations or projects in particular[17]. This suggests that the circumstances of the interviews and the way they were conducted meant that the interviewees felt relatively free to express what they wanted to say.

There are a number of reasons to explain why the armed groups in the East were overall in favour of the presence of NGOs:

- The continued presence of NGOs in Eastern DRC, which has enabled the groups to better understand humanitarian principles and codes of conduct;
- The knowledge that aid also benefits those close to them and their community as a whole;
- The desire to draw benefit from the aid themselves, in their role of combatants (IHL training, first aid, reintegration programmes, indirect aid provided to family members);
- The fact that speaking to NGOs means that they have been recognised as legitimate authorities in the area. Indeed, contrary to certain theories regarding the absence or failure of the Congolese State, which is widely talked about in academic and humanitarian circles, the Kivu provinces often demonstrate a different dynamic, where many armed groups try to re-establish the presence of an absent State rather than fighting against them. This is particularly evident through the adoption of military ranks and structures; the use of government-sounding titles and names, official seals and stamps or by even performing some government functions

16 See also: Chabal/Daloz (1999): *Africa Works. Disorder as a Political Instrument (African Issues)*. London: James Currey.
17 See the section "Suspicion and criticism" in the same section.

(administration of justice, police, migration, etc.). Some armed groups see themselves as running a true parallel administration and, therefore, perceive NGOs as organisations with a number of rights (to protection, etc.) and duties towards themselves[18] (to act within the law, keep armed group officials informed of their operations and travel plans, etc.):

> "NGOs cannot come here without security and we are the ones that provide that security" (interview AG n°21, 07/11/13, Shabunda territory).
>
> "Unfortunately, the NGOs that come here do not define their action plan clearly enough. For there to be any impact, they must show us the protocol agreement and the status of their project. That way, we can monitor their progress. We don't need their money but we do want to know how they spend it" (interview AG n°22, 07/11/13, Shabunda territory).
>
> "We recently arrested some agents belonging to NGO X who had gone on an awareness mission in location Z because they went to an area under our control without asking for our authorisation" (interview AG n°24, Kalehe territory).

- The desire to be seen by the population as the ones "bringing the NGOs" to the area (and, therefore, employment, etc.) – another illustration of the tendency of members of such groups to adopt behaviour reminiscent of that of a legitimate State;
- The desire to pay attention to their image towards the Congolese authorities and/or the international community – so as to avoid any eventual legal action but, partly, also in preparation for negotiations for integration into the regular Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) or to even win positions within the government. This phenomenon, which runs parallel to the increasingly professional communication of some armed groups operating in Eastern DRC manage their communication[19], is particularly true in the case of members of armed groups that occupy top military and/or political functions. An emblematic example of this desire for image management is demonstrated by the Raia Mukombozi coalition (based until November 2013 in Isezya, in Shabunda territory). It makes each of its commanders sign a document pledging that "troops under their responsibility shall not violate the Human Rights Act"[20]. This is a document that their leaders are all too eager to evoke when speaking with representatives of international organisations.

4.1.2 The logic of aid and aid workers

When interviewed about NGO objectives, most members of the armed groups surveyed replied that the aim of NGOs is to provide aid and support for development. They demonstrated a good overall understanding of the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. Even though they could seldom give a precise, theoretical definition, they could generally give concrete examples to back up their claim:

> "NGOs contact me before preparing their travel plans. To be able to work, the NGOs have to speak with all armed factions: the government, armed groups, etc. This is why some [humanitarian workers] are treated as "collaborators" but I understand. Neutrality is paramount" (interview AG n°1, 20/10/13, Bukavu)
>
> "Some combatants claim that they suffer discriminations because they are military personnel. However, since we bear arms, we cannot expect to be [helped by NGOs]. The wives of military personnel can benefit from [the aid], so it isn't too bad. I have explained that to my men" (interview AG n°22, 07/11/13, Shabunda territory).
>
> "NGO X works well. When the FARDC is at war with an armed group, they provide aid to everybody. They are neutral. Other NGOs don't work with the armed groups. Or, rather, they can collaborate with us sometimes, but military personnel never ride in NGO vehicles" (interview AG n°35, 23/11/13,

18 A form of non-state regulation by the armed groups. See in particular: Raeymaekers, Timothy/Menkhaus, Ken/Vlassenroot, Koen (2008): *State and non-state regulation in African protracted crises: governance without government?* Afrika Focus, Vol. 21, No. 2. Gand: Gents Afrika Platform. (http://www.gap.ugent.be/africafocus/pdf/08-21-2-IntroTKKenpdf.pdf)

19 This also highlights the increased presence of such groups on the social networks, such as Facebook and Twitter.

20 Document provided by the Raia Mukombozi coalition to the authors.

Masisi territory).

NGOs are often accused, precisely, of (allegedly) not respecting these humanitarian principles (alleged), thus resulting in cases of partiality, discrimination, etc... However, sometimes their criticism of NGOs not respecting humanitarian principles is clearly based on a misunderstanding of the principles themselves (see following section, "Suspicions and criticism").

Knowledge of the different aid workers varies widely from one combatant to another. The following extracts from two interviews conducted within the same armed groups are proof of such divergence of opinion. The first is an interview with a member of the political hierarchy, whilst the second is a rank-and-file combatant:

> "Donor X works both with NGO Y and the Roads Authority. They are violating the donor principles, who do not endorse the use of state services – yet they are using the *Office des Routes*. The controller is the person than the executor; that can't be right! (interview AG n°18, 06/11/13, Shabunda territory)

> "The NGOs can come here. There is [NGO X], the Roads Authority and [NGO Y]. X was the first to come here. It is the only one operating here but we don't see any change. They carry on working without consulting with the population. They come and go without seeking anyone's opinion. We also saw Y arrive because of the road but nothing has changed here in the past 3 years. Then they left and the *Office des Routes* came. They are just the same. They don't do much; they may repair a small stretch of the road and then take photos to show everyone that they have repaired the entire road, even though they have done a bad job of it" (interview AG n°21, 07/11/13, Shabunda territory).

This discrepancy in the understanding of the work carried out by aid workers is linked to three factors, which are looked into below: the armed groups in question; the position of the interviewee within their group and their personal background (social background, training, level of education, etc.).

4.2 Suspicion and criticism

Although the presence of humanitarian agencies is always deemed as necessary and welcome and that work carried out by NGOs is globally understood, members of the interviewed armed groups almost always follow up these positive remarks with carefully targeted criticism of organisations working in their area of operation. Most NGO criticism usually falls into one of three main categories: political, technical and developmental.

4.2.1 "Political" criticism of NGOs

One of the most common types of criticism aimed at NGOs can be coined "political criticism" because it is based on NGOs being perceived as partisan or as harbouring "hidden political agendas" when providing support or, on the contrary, discriminating against one community or armed groups in particular. A typical example of such criticism is highlighted by the following extract from an interview with an officer of an armed group present in Fizi territory (South Kivu):

> "There are many NGOs here. Several of them have a political agenda. Our group cannot work with them. It is usually those dedicated to peacebuilding that are politicised. The Local NGO [X], for example, brought some combatants from the community [A] for meetings, pretending they were civilians. The local NGO [Y] claims that it works for environmental conservation but the Mai Mai know that that isn't true. It's all politics. They are not neutral; on the contrary, they are on the side of community [A]. [A] is using the NGOs to play politics" (interview AG n°6, 28/10/13, Fizi territory).

In addition to the usual rhetoric of harbouring a "hidden agenda" or play "politics under the guise of providing humanitarian aid", combatants with such views sometimes make some very concrete accusations regarding the logistical support that certain NGOs allegedly provided to adversary groups:

> "The local NGO [X] is with community [A]. They are involved in politics. There is also the International NGO [Y] and the local NGOs [Z] and [Q], who are with [A]. In their trucks, they transport money, ammunition and arms. If you are financing these NGOs, you are financing community [A]" (interview AG n°7, 29/10/13, Fizi territory).
>
> "Some NGOs come here to dabble in politics covertly. They say that they are involved in development but they may be secretly collaborating with the enemy. They may be supplying ammunition or giving money to the armed groups. You can see some NGOs who, by day are distributing beans or identifying victims, but by night, when the people have left, these same NGOs signal to the armed groups to come down and then they give them ammunition" (interview AG n°2, 24/10/13, Uvira territory).
>
> "The only one helping here is NGO [Z]. They helped our group by giving us two revolvers, two Motorolas, 14 boxes of ammunition, 14 kalashnikovs, 14 boots and 57 trainings" (interview AG n°24, 11/11/13, Kalehe territory).

How should we interpret this criticism and how can we identify members of armed groups that are most likely to harbour such views? Based on the interviews conducted:

- Such views are most likely to be held by "rank-and-file" in areas of high conflict and/or significant ethnic heterogeneity (see section on "Influence of the socio-ethnic situation");
- These suspicions are often linked to the movement of vehicles and NGO agents: if the members of the armed groups don't know where they are going or what they are transporting, they tend to interpret such movements as supplying enemies. It is not only NGOs that are accused of being partial; MONUSCO also draws a lot of suspicion, since some combatants believe that some helicopter movements are involved in provisioning armed groups located in remote areas – FDLR in particular;
- Lastly, members of armed groups who express such criticism often state that they don't like the NGOs who are "involved in peace missions". They are usually accused of having more of a "hidden political agenda" than other aid workers. One possible explanation for such a negative perception is that, on the one hand, the work of the NGOs is seen as trying to bring about the demobilisation of a section of the troops. Another possible explanation is that such NGOs are not so welcome because they give less immediate aid to relatives and members of the community of origin of the combatants than, for example, NGOs that provide emergency medical treatment or those involved in food safety.

Perceptions of partiality and accusations of having a "hidden political agenda": how likely is this to lead to an incident happening?

Even though incidents such as the assassination in October 2011 of seven employees of a local NGO in Fizi territory remain very rare, the perception of partiality remains a big danger both for national and international NGOs. Even if they don't motivate attacks against NGOs directly, such accusations are likely to justify any such attacks. Because of the proximity between the civilian population and military actors in the Kivu provinces and their everyday interaction[21], such a perception may also be fuelled by the armed groups to provoke uprisings amongst the population.

21 See Verweijen, Judith (2013): *Military business and the business of the military in the Kivu provinces*. London: Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 40, No. 135, pp. 67–82.

4.2.2 "Technical" criticism of NGOs

The second main criticism identified is of a "technical" nature; members of armed groups complain of the incompetence (voluntary or not) shown by NGOs assigned to implement certain projects. Most of them know how to use the language and principles associated with humanitarian work themselves to justify their demands. The two interview extracts below, one with the commander of an armed group present in Shabunda territory (South Kivu); the other with the Second-in-Command of a group present in Masisi territory (North Kivu), highlight such criticism:

> "The first example regarding development relates to the road. It is the cooperation agency [X] that is funding that. Every year, [X] releases money. But you should see the state of the road! The NGOs assigned to implement the project don't have the necessary skills. How on earth were they able to win the project? I contacted [the UN agency] Z and said to them: before implementing any rehabilitation project, you have to conduct topographic and geotechnical surveys; draw up an environmental and social management plan; a community development plan and an implementation schedule" (interview AG n°18, 06/11/13, Shabunda territory).

> "At the health centre located in L., you won't find any pills or equipment, just a sign saying that NGO X is in charge. The same applies to the health centre located in M. Go and see for yourself; you will see how the sick are treated. (…) The main reason is that there is no follow-up. People say they are repairing the roads, whereas they are just embezzling the money. The other problem is that they don't come with appropriate tools to carry out repairs; they come with spades, hoes and machetes" (interview AG n°31, 21/11/13, Masisi territory).

Such criticism is expressed mostly by members of armed groups wielding important political or military roles and who are relatively well-educated (above the Congolese *Diplome d'Etat*), but who may not necessarily have any personal experience in the field of development and/or humanitarian work (contrary to the "developmental" criticisms mentioned below).

In this type of discourses, accusations of incompetence are very often linked to accusations of mismanagement or even embezzlement. However, as mentioned above, NGOs that provide emergency medical treatment – almost certainly because their work is more directly related to members of the armed groups – are relatively spared from such criticism:

> "Some of the NGOs who come here don't complete their mission due to insufficient funding. Some of the agents assigned to the area are given a budget but they try to save on expenses so as to keep the money for themselves. For example, the NGOs in charge of building schools: a large amount of the budget is embezzled and we are left with poor quality buildings. Those in charge of repairing roads are a problem, too. They've always been known to keep some of the money for themselves. Only some NGOs involved in the provision of health services complete their mission, say 80% of their objectives, contrary to those involved in development" (interview AG n°29, 20/11/13, Masisi territory)

This sort of opinion goes hand in hand with a more general, over-arching phenomenon, i.e., aid beneficiaries are becoming more and more aware of the fact that humanitarian agents are theoretically being increasingly recruited for their precise skills set and so they expect to receive a certain level of quality in the implementation of projects. This concept is evident in certain interviews with members of armed groups:

> "The contract to repair roads was awarded to NGO [Y]. I don't understand how the latter was ever able to win a contract, judging from the poor quality of their work. They are using poor quality wood; they don't have any engineers and demonstrate a lack of professionalism in their construction work. It's the same people in charge of building the culverts; just look at the useless headwall that they've built, with a wrong inclination, etc. I have told them to go and hire an engineer and for the first time they have hired one. He came to show me his CV. Let's see if he has the necessary skills." (interview AG n°18, 06/11/13, Shabunda territory).

Perception of incompetence: how likely is this to lead to an incident?

Only in some very rare cases does this seem likely to lead to incidents. In one case in South Kivu, such a criticism almost led to the NGO involved being "expelled" from the area but that was more the exception than the rule (this incident was related to the personality and background of the commander concerned). Usually, populations who don't want to see a source of their aid and revenue disappear, even if deemed to be ineffective or ill-suited, put pressure on the armed groups not to compromise the presence and activities of the humanitarian workers operating in the area.

4.2.3 "Developmental" criticism of NGOs

This third main type of criticism concerns the younger members of armed groups, usually with political functions (spokesperson, president of the political branch, etc.) within the groups, or some military positions with administrative functions (secretary, in charge of administration and finance, etc.). It is interesting to note that a large part of this category of members of the armed groups has usually undergone some form of training in rural development. As an example, within the coalition called Defence Movement for the Liberty of Congo (MDLC), whose political branch is based in Uvira, five members (out of a total number of six) of the political office are also local NGO coordinators or international NGO agents.

They criticise the NGOs of not listening to beneficiaries and of making little use of local labour (they know about the principle of using local labour where possible in intervention projects and, therefore, criticise the NGOs for not adhering to this principle):

> "You must give work to the youth born in this area: some of them can drive motorbikes, others are educated. When these young people work, they redistribute the wealth amongst their families, etc. That is positive. However, the NGOs don't hire the locals. And when we ask them to, they simply say: "you are tribal". Isn't it part of the humanitarian principle to include local populations! And in Kalehe for example, they are working together" (interview AG n°18, 06/11/13, Shabunda territory)

> "There is a problem in the way we hire people in the Congo. It is usually a complicated process. All the NGOs operating in the area tend to hire people based on recommendation. When an NGO arrives in Kinshasa, Kinshasa informs Bukavu, who in turn informs other sub-branches [of families in power]. When the NGOs finally arrive in the area, they put out a tender for a number of positions. However, it is just a farce; during the selection process, you will find that it is those recommended who get hired. This is why there are so many armed groups: we understood that taking up arms facilitates access to jobs. To be hired here, you have to have been armed because that is the only way they will negotiate with you and give you a job"" (interview AG n°11, 31/10/13, Uvira territory).

Such attention to the "community" and "base" sometimes leads members of armed groups to complain of patronage by members of one community to the detriment of another, or even of corruption or other criminal activities:

> "The NGOs who come to us sometime arrive with their minds already made up. They impose development without seeking the opinion of the local population or asking them what their priorities are. (…) In the *Hauts Plateaux* racism is rife; the NGOs only hire people from certain communities, whereas they are supposed to hire solely on one's competence. (…) We have to find a solution to this situation because development must be endogenous. Instead, however, people are given jobs based on their family ties. The Congolese authorities recommend those close to them. Educated people living locally are neglected. This causes disruption and conflicts" (interview AG n°11, 31/10/13, Uvira territory).

> "Some NGO agents practice favouritism; they say "if I know you, I'll give you work, otherwise I won't". These agents are not from here, they come from Bukavu. They only give work to those they know. Ideally, when identifying beneficiaries, the *chefs d'Avenue* (local leaders) should be present to oversee that it is done properly" (interview AG n°25, 11/11/13, Kalehe territory).

As mentioned when speaking of criticism of a "technical" nature, accusations of embezzlement and bribery are often made by the younger generation. They sometimes witnessed such practises themselves in their role of NGO coordinators or employees:

> "I am *licencié* (graduate) in rural development and was the director of two universities. Nevertheless, I am still jobless because to NGOs, if you do not belong to the family, you are just not hired. Sometimes, if you want a job, you are asked to pay them one or two months of your salary. It is complicated" (interview AG n°26, 17/11/13, Masisi territory).

> "I did a two-month internship in NGO X when I was in the third year of university. I was sent to supervise some evaluation activities in the Ruzizi Plain [in Uvira territory]. It was a project worth over 200 000 dollars but the so-called community crop field measured only 2x50 m^2. For 200 000 dollars! It was nothing. I don't know where the money went; it was probably embezzled. (…) There is also the problem of bribery and commissions" (interview AG n°12, 01/11/13, Uvira territory).

Most members of armed groups interviewed who suspected NGO employees of embezzlement or other illegal practices vehemently condemned these practices, saying that they are harmful to beneficiaries. However, it is interesting to point out that in some cases members of armed groups appear to be rather indifferent towards such practices:

> "We are not interested in embezzlement or any other illegal practices going on. We don't interfere in NGO business" (interview AG n°40, 08/12/13, Masisi territory).

> "It's their business if embezzlement is going on; it is in their interest. What is important to us is that they carry out the development for us; that they build roads, hospitals and schools" (interview AG n°41, 09/12/13, Masisi territory).

> "To have your project funded, you have to give back between 10% and 20% of the budget. I know a project by the local NGO Y to build some health centres, funded by International NGO Z where, of the 18 000 dollars budgeted, 1800 has been paid to the local staff of Z. That's just the way it is. It is patronage" (interview AG n°12, 01/11/13, Uvira territory).

Perception of patronage or corruption: how likely is this to lead to an incident?

In some areas, members of armed groups interviewed are clearly convinced that some humanitarian workers have embezzled funds set aside for the construction of roads, bridges, schools and hospitals or that they have simply pilfered food aid or NFI. Such claims may be based on proven instances of corruption that have led those interviewed to believe that the practice is widespread, especially when such suspicion is backed up by the salaries or the type of lifestyles led by some NGO employees (expatriate and local) in comparison with the normal standard of living of the populations in the concerned area. Although there aren't any proven cases of incidents being provoked by armed groups to protest against such practices, it cannot be excluded that some armed groups have been used to settle personal disputes (linked to recruitment procedures, favouritism, etc.). Also, claims of embezzlement help spread the idea that NGO employees are rich, which may be a contributing factor in armed robberies (even though they may theoretically be committed by mere criminals and not by members of armed groups. The difference between both categories is sometimes blurred).

Confidence in donors

Underlying these criticisms is a degree of confidence in donors and coordination agencies. Members of armed groups often claim that local NGO agents "trick" their donors or their HQ into believing that they are doing a good job, whereas this not always the case:

> "Some NGO supervisors pursue their own selfish interests and hope to get rich on the back of the international community. They try to justify the resources put at their disposal by their donors

through the use of armed groups. They set up fictitious projects: they arrive in large numbers in vehicle convoys flying flags just to make their presence felt but without really doing anything" (interview AG n°38, 03/12/13, Nyiragongo territory).

"NGO X is not living up to everybody's expectations. (…) They provide insufficient medical supplies. They are just fooling people by telling OCHA, etc. that they are working here but they are not really doing much" (interview AG n°15, 06/11/13, Shabunda territory).

In comparison to the NGOs assigned to implement projects, the donors enjoy at least one positive image:

"We know that embezzlement is an issue. Where does that come from? Donors send funds for good reasons, there is no problem in that. It's when the money arrives in Congo that it starts to get siphoned off by expatriates and locals alike. When it gets here, people just help themselves" (interview AG n°26, 17/11/13, Masisi territory)

4.3 Factors influencing the perception of and attitude towards NGOs

These were set out in the previous section: the opinions of NGOs by members of armed groups are quite varied. They are based both on rumours and suspicion and on a good understanding of humanitarian work. The presence of NGOs is generally accepted but the work that they do is subject to much criticism. Regardless of perception, what armed groups do in response is also very varied: not only is this diversity of reaction apparent from the interviews conducted, it was also confirmed by direct observation during the field survey. The question is how is this variety of perceptions and attitudes can be interpreted? Moreover, is it possible for humanitarian workers to anticipate them and, thus, adapt their access strategy and any future method of contact? This section offers some possible answers to these questions, whilst at the same time giving an overview of the factors that most clearly influence the perceptions and attitudes of members of armed groups towards NGOs in the Kivu provinces. It may help orientating humanitarian workers in setting up a framework to develop own analyses based on their particular context of intervention.

The divergence of opinions regarding one same NGO by members of an armed group is mainly linked to three factors: type of armed groups, their rank in the group and their own personal background.

4.3.1 Factors linked to the type of armed group

Influence based on the type of armed group

The identity and characteristics (size, degree of organisation, geographical origin, and main cultural traits) of the armed groups concerned are amongst the main factors influencing perception and attitude towards humanitarian workers and their work. Analysing the responses from the interviews held with the members of armed groups highlights three broad types of groups in terms of perception and behaviour[22].

22 These are indeed broad indicative categories, aimed at facilitating analyse. However, they do not claim to reflect the diversity of cases present in North and South Kivu perfectly. Therefore, some groups may find themselves at the border of one side or the other, such as PARC-FAAL (Mai Mai Yakutumba), who boast some form both of centralised and decentralised national groups.

Centralised national groups (e.g., ex-M23, APCLS, NDC/Cheka)

- Having a strong hold over their area of control (except when engaged in battles) often means that access to the area concerned has to be negotiated with the group before any intervention. Such groups often set up "checkpoints" in strategic areas (both to check the identity of those coming into and leaving the area and to collect tolls) and can usually communicate with the various other check points and headquarters using *walkie-talkies.* They also usually have a clear military hierarchy, which enables them to set up internal communication chains;
- The more centralised groups usually have a branch or political office that serves as a possible entry point for humanitarian workers needing to establish contact with these groups, so as to ensure their safe passage. However, it is always important to verify with a third party (ideally, with military members of the same groups) that these political representatives are actually credible and legitimate – indeed, it isn't rare for some political entrepreneurs based in Goma or Bukavu to declare themselves as "representatives" of armed groups without the approval of the top brass;
- Lastly, these groups are often mindful about wanting to project a professional and well-disciplined image to foreigners – the ex-M23 is one such example. This can sometimes facilitate the task of aid workers, as it often means that they are less likely to be subject to "*tracasseries*" or to even more serious incidents, albeit that such declaration of good will is not always translated into action in the field.

Decentralised national groups (e.g. Raia Mutomboki, Nyatura, Mai Mai and Local Defence)

- The fact that these groups have maintained strong links with the local populations proves to be an advantage to access by humanitarian workers because, as aid beneficiaries, the population can sometimes put pressure on them to be more respectful towards NGOs;
- Therefore, the geographical movements of these groups must be monitored carefully: when they are forced to move (for some particular operation) away from the area where most of their members originate from, their attitude can change. Being more detached from the local population may erode the "positive" effects mentioned in the previous paragraph. Moreover, having to move away from an area may also mean a loss of revenue (limited or non-existent access to land; fewer chances of receiving "contributions" or taxes), which could drive them to carry out attacks on NGOs for economic reasons – theft of equipment, etc.;
- The fact that these groups are often divided into somewhat independent branches and that they are subject to constant leadership battles (such is the case amongst the Nyatura, for instance) also affects access by humanitarian workers in a different way: the competitiveness between the different branches means that commanders are always vying to appear as "the one who the *Bazungu* look up to". This situation constitutes both an advantage for the NGOs (the group is more likely to be open to contact) and a risk: competitive commanders of a same group that has established contact through another commander may seek to undermine the work of the aid workers to demonstrate that their competitors don't have real control over the area.

Foreign groups (e.g., FDLR, FNL, ADF-Nalu)

- Given that these armed groups often don't feel accountable to the communities in the areas they operate, they often have a different relationship with humanitarian workers: a relationship less based on the role of interface between the community and aid providers than the national groups;

- The fact that they are often the target of operations carried out by FARDC, MONUSCO or by regular armed forces of their own country (e.g., see operations by the Burundian army against FNL in the Ruzizi Plain in 2013) makes them all the more closed and on the defensive than national groups, which can complicate contact with them by humanitarian workers;
- These conclusions are not, however, intangible, because some of them (especially FDLR) sometimes remain long enough in some areas for them to develop relationships with the local communities and to establish alliances with national groups;
- Within this category, one can find groups known for their fairly strict, centralised command chain, such as FDLR and those with a looser command structure, such as FNL. In the case of the former, contact with the main commanders may suffice to negotiate access, whilst in the latter case, negotiations can prove more complicated due to the independence of the minor commanders, who are more likely to conduct harassment campaigns or even initiate attacks of their own accord;
- FDLR is also an exception because of its professional communication structure. Contrary to FNL or ADF-Nalu, FDLR sometimes tries to establish positive contacts with some expatriates either on an individual basis or through their NGOs.

Perception of the nationality of NGOs and expatriate employees

Some armed groups appear mindful of the nationality of NGO expatriate employees. This is particularly true in the case of groups such as FDLR, for whom the position of some Western States during the 1994 genocide and their attitude towards the current regime in Kigali always acts as an important framework. For example, French nationals and, by extension, NGOs whose HQs are based in France appear to enjoy an amount of sympathy by members of this group. The apparent warming of relations between the French and Rwandan governments in 2011 doesn't appear to have affected this perception.

Some members of the Mai Mai groups also appear to show an amount of sympathy towards French speakers in general, as opposed to English speakers, who are perceived as supporters of the Rwandan President, Paul Kagame – who is seen by most of these groups as an adversary. This is especially so amongst certain groups in the south of South Kivu, who speak of fear of "infiltration" by "Rwandan allies".

A more unexpected factor is the celebrity status of certain sports personalities (footballers, in particular), whose notoriety in their country of origin appears to contribute to the positive perception held by certain members of armed groups – this applies to expatriates both of American and European origin as well as of African origin.

What is one to make of such perceptions, in particular in terms of their consequences on relations between NGOs and armed groups? It is evident that the generally positive disposition towards nationals from certain countries may encourage contacts, particularly in the case of groups in a defensive or uncertain situation (e.g., when they are engaged in military operations or regarding some sensitive subjects such as their sources of funding.) However, it must also be highlighted that no single incident suggests that a negative opinion would lead to direct attacks on expatriates simply because of their nationality.

Finally, the ability to speak several languages – and in particular for expatriates whose mother tongue is English but who can speak French and/or Swahili fluently – sometimes seems to lead members of armed groups to suspect such expatriates of spying for their government.

Influence of state presence

Areas with substantial presence of the Congolese state:

- If armed groups find themselves in an area with significant presence of the Congolese state administration, there tends to be less "monitoring" of the work carried out by aid workers – as monitoring is theoretically covered by the state authorities. Although this may mean that there are fewer restrictions for aid workers, it also brings its own specific risk, as some armed groups may try to launch attacks to demonstrate their ability to challenge state authority;
- In the specific case where the armed groups themselves are the target of FARDC and/or MONUSCO operations, these groups tend to limit their contacts with aid workers drastically (partly for logistical obstacles but also mistrust, so as not to reveal their positions, as was the case with M23 in October 2013 and NDC/Cheka in November 2013, for example). However, the same groups may at the same time appear more welcoming to NGOs likely to provide them with direct assistance, such as NGOs providing emergency medical treatment.

Areas not controlled by FARDC (and where there is an absence of Congolese state agents):

- In areas where armed groups assume administrative functions (tax collection, etc.) and/or in areas of weak presence of FARDC, their members generally consider that it is the NGOs' duty to inform them of their presence or even to request authorisation to work/for access. Therefore, in order to ensure safe passage for aid workers, it is important for the latter to maintain contact with representatives of the groups or those with close ties and to ensure that their name, logos and the activities of the NGOs are generally known to them. It is difficult to say whether it is advisable or not to give them prior warning before making any travel plans, as this is dependent on context. It does help allay the suspicion of having a "hidden agenda", as mentioned above – (and therefore, probably, also prevents some incidents linked to such suspicion) but also raises the risk that information relating to any travel plans may be used to prepare ambushes (although only very few cases have been recorded, a potential risk remains);
- In the particular case of some Mai Mai or Raia Mutomboki groups (usually groups with strong links to the populations) that have a clear political branch and/or relatively well-educated military commanders, a particular kind of relationship with NGOs can emerge. It often takes the shape of a monitoring relationship, i.e., the armed group 'surveying the quality' of the NGO intervention (a typical example being the Raia Mukombozi coalition headed by Daniel Meshe and Albert Kahasha, "Foka Mike", based in Northeast Shabunda)[23]. This can render the jobs of aid workers more complicated (with repeated complaints about the quality of the projects or about neglected zones). However, it may also be seen as a positive factor bearing in mind that good understanding of International Humanitarian Law and humanitarian principles by these commanders reduces the risk of deliberate attacks on humanitarian workers (except for unforeseen incidents that may occur against the orders of the commander).

23 Coalition whose main leaders surrendered to FARDC in November 2013 (see appendix for details).

Influence of the socio-ethnic situation: the example of Fizi territory

Accusations of NGO "partiality" (i.e. of favouring one community over another) appears to be stronger in territories where different socio-ethnic groups cohabit.

As such, in Fizi territory (South Kivu), where the Bafulero, Babembe and Banyamulenge populations cohabit, there is an overlapping of three different types of partiality-related accusations:

- Firstly, the Mai Mai groups who recruit mainly from the Babembe claim that certain NGOs "favour the Banyamulenge population", in particular the NGOs involved in reconciliation or intercommunity mediation. One reason for this suspicion is based on the historical interpretation of the wars in the East by these groups, who see themselves as "locals" fighting against the "invasion" of their land by armed groups supported by Rwanda. They believe that, historically, the international community has supported the "aggressors"[24] and has used the NGOs to provide aid to the Rwandan-speaking populations of South Kivu, accused of being Rwandan "spies";
- Secondly, the feeling expressed by the Bafulero populations and the Mai Mai groups recruiting mainly from that community, that the NGOs are "partial to the Babembe" and voluntarily neglecting the Bafulero:

  > "The NGOs are doing a good job in Baraka but they are not going as far as the *Moyens Plateaux* and *Hauts Plateaux*, which need schools and hospitals. (…) We want the NGOs to go and provide aid to those in the *Moyens* and *Hauts Plateaux* as well; not only to the Babembe but also to the Bafulero. (…) If the NGOs continue as they are doing [to favour the Babembe], they will be worsening the situation instead of helping it" (interview AG n°03, 27/10/2013, Fizi territory)

  This perception is mainly due to difficulty accessing certain villages because of the bad state of the roads, which forces some NGOs to focus their efforts around urban centres (Baraka and Central Fizi), which is populated mainly by Bembe households, thus abandoning more remote areas (occupied mainly by the Bafulero, especially in the *Hauts Plateaux* of Fizi and in the entire area located south of Minembwe);
- Lastly, the feeling expressed by all three communities – and their related armed groups – that many NGOs practice some form of patronage in favour of the communities located in Bukavu or even in Kinshasa, because their workers are frequently hired in these urban centres.

The Fizi territory illustrates how logistical (limited access to certain remote areas), historical (the question regarding the conflicts that have affected the province) and socio-economic (favouritism practiced by national and provincial authorities) factors can lead to entrenched opinions likely to affect humanitarian work.

The link between socio-ethnic heterogeneity and how opinions or accusations of partiality by armed groups are formed is also evident in Mwenga and Kalehe (with suspicion of support going to FDLR by Raia Mutomboki) or even, to a lesser extent, in Masisi and Walikale (with mutual accusations between NDC/Cheka and APCLS). On the other hand, the relative ethnic homogeneity in the North-East parts of Shabunda territory explains why, despite the very critical feelings expressed by Raia Mutomboki operating in the area against the NGOs, the latter are seldom accused of partiality.

4.3.2 Factors linked to the position of interviewed combatants in the respective group

The interviews conducted enable us to establish that the differences in opinion or understanding

24 Indeed, a distinction isn't always made between the Rwandan-speaking population living on Congolese soil (such as the Banyamulenge who have been there for around two centuries) and more recent migrants (such as the FDLR and their relatives).

are also linked to the rank and job (political or military, in particular) of armed group members.

- As a general rule, military leaders and political representatives of these groups are the most informed about NGO operations, not only because they are invariably the best educated but also because their jobs within the group involves interacting more often with aid workers;
- However, this does not mean that their subordinates are ignorant of humanitarian work. Rank-and-file combatants are just more knowledgeable about their humanitarian practises (as opposed to the more theoretical principles). They developed such knowledge through their everyday interaction with NGOs (when crossing checkpoints, for example): identifying the various logos and emblems; ability to check a mission order or a service map and understanding principles such as preventing humanitarian vehicles from carrying military personnel (even though understanding this principle does not always mean abiding by it);
- It has been observed in some cases, within decentralised groups (Raia Mutomboki mainly), that some minor commanders suspect their superiors of being in collusion with NGOs:

> "We always allow NGO X through a checkpoint easily without searching them [as we do in the case of commercial vehicles, in particular]. Our leaders tell us to let them through. Our leaders are very corrupt" (interview AG n°15, 06/11/13, Shabunda territory)

Although details regarding this accusation by a member of an armed group operating in Shabunda territory are patchy, it is easy to imagine that the instructions passed on by some military leaders to respect humanitarian principles can sometimes be interpreted by some combatants – who have probably only been ordered not to "harass" aid workers", for example – as the result of a secret deal between their boss and the NGO (commercial, trafficking in minerals, etc.). This possibility must encourage aid workers not only to spread awareness and information to the main commanders of the armed groups but also to establish and maintain contact, albeit minimal (e.g., exchanging greetings and having brief conversations when crossing checkpoints) with their subordinates, especially for groups with a decentralised structure. (See also the section, "Conclusions and possible recommendations").

4.3.3 Factors relating to personal backgrounds

Because of the wide geographical area covered in this study, we were unable to follow the personal backgrounds of each member of the armed groups surveyed. It is, however, possible to highlight a few factors that are likely to influence the perception and attitude of these members at an individual level:

- Level and type of education: although there isn't a systematic link between level of education and having a more or less positive opinion about work carried out by NGOs, it transpires that being exposed to certain training significantly influences perception. Members of armed groups with some training in rural development are often well informed and rather critical about humanitarian workers, whose lack of consultation with the "base" they deplore (see section on "Developmental criticism" of NGOs, above);
- Socio-economic background: members of armed groups who were raised in particularly poor environments are also less likely to be well educated and, therefore, less conversant with the guideline principles governing humanitarian aid. But, at the same time, they are also likely to have been beneficiaries of certain programmes implemented by NGOs and, therefore, somewhat familiar with humanitarian work;
- International experience: having lived in a foreign country themselves (or a member of their family) is a factor that clearly influences the perception of humanitarian workers. Some members of armed groups have indeed sometimes lived as refugees in Tanzania, Burundi, Rwanda, South Africa, Europe or the United States. This generally makes such members of armed groups more critical and demanding of NGO projects. They often cite the situation abroad to demonstrate the (supposed) bad treatment of the populations in DRC.

5. Conclusions and possible recommendations

In addition to the various suggestions proffered in this report regarding special cases, we would like to suggest a few possible general recommendations to humanitarian workers.

Important:

It is not the role of INSO and the authors of this study to give instructions to NGOs regarding their safety and access policy. It is up to each individual NGO to decide whether or not to establish contact (and how) with the armed groups operating in their area of intervention. There is no "right" or "wrong" way.

However, we would like to offer some advice to NGOs who are trying to establish contact with armed groups but don't know how to go about it. They are given for guidance only and must be fine-tuned and adapted to each individual context of intervention.

The INSO team remains at the disposal of any organisation wishing to discuss any special cases in more details.

5.1 Contact verification

Cases of fraud have been recorded in both provinces (individuals pretending to be commanders and calling NGO agents to ask them for units or other resources). Therefore, one has to be vigilant, ensuring to cross check every contact, telephone number and the identity of the different armed group representatives with other organisations (or, where necessary, with INSO) and to do likewise when meeting people personally.

5.2 Project a uniform image to all those involved in the conflicts

As already highlighted in this report, uncertainty can lead to accusations of duplicity, spying or of NGO employees harbouring a "hidden agenda" against NGO employees. To limit such suspicion, it is necessary to be able to identify and, thus, avoid any situation that could lead members of armed groups to suspect that you are "hiding something" from them:

- Do not try to hide any contact you may have with "adversary" groups (the information will leak out sooner or later). Instead, inform them of such contacts. Explain why and remind them that as an NGO, your work means that you sometimes have to interact with every player in your area of intervention;
- Keep in mind that many armed groups carefully read NGO reports published on the internet (either personally for those that are more organised, or through the diaspora, often very much present on the Internet and very influential with certain commanders). Therefore, it is advisable to ensure that what you say in the field is as close as possible to what your findings or conclusions say in such reports. Appearing to be overly cordial with some members of armed groups, only to find that later on, your organisation publishes a report denouncing their group for violating Human Rights, for example, risks becoming a problem both for the agent and the organisation (you may be accused of being a traitor or of manipulation by the adversary, etc.). In such situations, it is best to restrict any contact to a minimum. Where possible, context permitting, warn the group in question of the imminent publication of a report accusing them of

something. Explaining the reasons for such a report may help limit their opinion of your being disloyal and mean they maintain a minimum dialogue with you;

- In order to reduce any discrepancy between the image given by the agents in the field and official NGO statements, creating a space within your organisation where security officers and communication and/or advocacy officers can meet to discuss and share views could be helpful;
- Explain any unusual activities: if you are embarking on any significant or unusual travel plans, maybe you could let the armed groups know of your reasons for the travel plan (not necessarily contacting the armed groups directly but more generally, via local radios, for example), so as not to give them any reason to suspect you of supplying arms or trading in minerals.

5.3 Avoid excessively "personalised" contacts with armed groups

In Eastern DRC as in other areas of humanitarian intervention, there is the tendency to establish personal (and often informal ones) contacts with members of armed groups. This is usually between the groups and national employees, whose acquaintance may go back a long time. The employees are usually referred to by name, rather than by their organisation. Such contacts exist because people who have been in the area for years and are known to most of the armed groups represent a precious (human) resource for some NGOs. Although such personal contacts may be very useful, they also raise a number of questions. Placing all the burden of responsibility for such contacts onto the shoulders of a single person indeed raises a number of risks:

- The person in question may be manipulated or even become exposed to threats and intimidation (members of armed groups may use the knowledge of certain details of the person's private life to their own advantage or to blackmail them);
- The departure or absence of such a precious resource risks creating a void. Making relationships personal does not always help create a strong identity for the organisation (known by their name or colours) that can act as better protection than any employee;
- For the humanitarian community in general, because in the long run these people may develop little practices (give some *unités*, buy a beer or even more) that may be interpreted as the norm by the armed groups.
- In order to establish links more easily with members of armed groups, some NGOs prefer to send "locals" into the field. This practice has many advantages and really does seem to open up opportunities to develop friendly relationships. However, one should remember that as locals, such employees will also be subject to a lot of pressure: they are often seen by the populations and the armed groups, as "son of the soil" that has "made it" and their refusal, for example, to give combatants *cigarettes*, *pombe, rapport, massage* or *sabuni*[25], could lead to misunderstandings.

The points below may come in useful in order to establish a balance between the need for a personal touch (which, nevertheless, remains a condition for building a reliable relationship) and the need to institutionalise relations with the armed groups:

- Assign a "security" telephone number for exchanges with members of armed groups that is different from the agent's personal number (this also helps avoid anonymous threats and intimidation, several cases of which have been reported);
- Establish an effective system of "hand-over" with a data base of the most frequent contacts within each armed group (complete with varying periods of transition in the event of a

25 Names given to small sums of money often demanded by the combatants of such groups.

replacement, during which the former and replacement employee work in pairs);

- Restrict occasions where agents work alone, by sending them in pairs, where possible, (one "local" and one "non-local") when going into areas occupied by armed groups – if enough human resources are available to that end.

5.4 Don't neglect the "rank-and-file": implement humanitarian principles

As mentioned above, the study demonstrates that good contact with a commander or a spokesperson is not always enough to ensure safe access: ordinary combatants are often both not very conversant with humanitarian principles and objectives and very likely to undermine the latter (through *tracasseries*, robberies, etc.). This finding gives rise to two recommendations:

- Set out the humanitarian "principles" as a series of "practical rules" that can be understood by most combatants: display stickers on vehicles (reminding people that you do not carry arms and passengers other than members of staff and urgent medical supplies), "codes of conduct" issued by the HQ should be both translated into French and Swahili (and local agents should keep a copy to hand on missions);
- More generally, it is useful to establish ways and forms of contacts with lower-ranking combatants: speak with them when crossing checkpoints, spread awareness through beneficiaries or distribute communication materials (leaflets etc.) to commanders in order to help the message being passed down to their troops. It is always advisable to maintain your patience when speaking with any member of an armed group.

5.5 Manage breaches of humanitarian and operational principles

Whilst knowing and endeavouring to respect the humanitarian principles as well as the operational rules of their own organisation, some NGO agents may find themselves in a situation where they have to waive these rules for protective purposes during tense situations with armed groups. Two observations can be made in this regard:

- Some incidents highlighted during the course of this survey appear to relate to "broken promises" towards members of armed groups; be it projects not implemented or informal promises (even promises made at personal level) made by agents in the field regarding logistical or financial aid to certain members of these groups. Because field teams and, in particular, national employees tend to be more exposed, ensure they are aware of the dangers of such behaviour that may appear to be an easy way out of a tense situation in the field but which, in the long run, may endanger the physical integrity of NGO agents. The latter can become targets of reprisals by members of the armed group that was made an unkept promise or by an enemy armed group accusing them of partiality);
- For the same reasons, when assistance is provided under duress (provision of a vehicle, etc.), don't just "let it be", as to do so may simply have the effect of increasing this type of threat. Inform the commander of the group concerned about the incident; consider suspending programmes in the area or even make the incident more generally known (to the communities, local authorities, etc.) so that the episode does not become distorted and interpreted as the provision of voluntary support to an armed group by the NGO.

Lastly, establishing internal mechanisms for agents to be able to report such incidents "safely" (which don't expose them to sanction – unless in the most serious cases) enables you to get to know of more cases of breech of humanitarian principles and to set up appropriate measures to limit any negative consequences they may have on the organisation.

6. Appendix I: List of the main armed groups active in Eastern DRC

The appendices that follow show the list of the main armed groups active in Eastern DRC[26] at the time the study (as briefly presented in section 2 of this report) was conducted. It adds details of their background, leadership, hierarchy, alliances, networks and types of operations. Unless otherwise stated, all the information that appears in this appendix is based on research carried out by INSO consultants between October and December 2013 or on prior surveys carried out by the authors in their academic research on North and South Kivu.

Important note n°1: all military ranks mentioned here were self-attributed by members of these groups (and not military ranks authorised officially by FARDC).
Important note n°2: during the drafting of this report, there were a number of political and military developments in Eastern DRC, the main one being the demise of M23 as a military force (following their defeat at the hands of the joint forces of FARDC and the MONUSCO Intervention Brigade.). This event is likely to continue having significant repercussions on the topography of the armed groups after the publication of this report and this is why its authors advise aid workers to monitor any such developments.
Important note n°3: for strategic reasons, armed groups often refuse to disclose their number of combatants or deliberately provide "inflated" figures. It is also very difficult for researchers or independent observers to count their actual numbers in the field, due to the dispersion of the troops and the inaccessibility of some positions. Therefore, any numbers given are solely for guidance.

6.1 Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (ADF-NALU)

Background: the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) was initially an armed group created in 1980 and opposed to the regime of Yoweri Museveni, who was in power in Uganda. Its combatants took exile in DRC in the mid-1990s and changed their name to ADF-NALU[27].

Leadership: Jamil Mukulu (Commander in Chief).

Number of members: 500-1000.

Hierarchy:

Jamil Mukulu, Hood Lukwago (Commander), Amis Kashada (Vice-Commander), Muhammad Kayira (Head of Operations), Benjamin Kisokolanio (Head of Intelligence), Philip Muzamir Bogere (Operations), Mukwaya (Kikingi Commander), Amigo Kibirige (Mwalika Commander).[28]

Alliances: links with the Al-Shabaab Movement (*harakat al-shabaab al-mujahideen*) often cited by the Ugandan government and commented about by various analysts but there are very few concrete factors to enable us to know the effective amount of collaboration between both organisations. Some sources also say it has links with RUD-Urunana, UPC, URDC and occasional contacts with FARDC.

26 See Vogel 2013, *Mapping*.
27 See International Crisis Group (2012): *Eastern Congo: The ADF-NALU Lost Rebellion, Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°93*. Brussels: ICG.
28 See http://www.monitor.co.ug/News/National/ADF-operating-with-more-than-1-500-fighters/-/688334/1916178/-/ykuuo5/-/index.html.

Networks and main support: part of the Nande population and the Congolese population of Muslim faith. ADF-NALU have also maintained networks in Uganda.

Types of operations: mainly known for the kidnapping of civilians.

Location (late 2013): surrounding areas of Beni. In December 2013, significant movement of ADF-NALU combatants were reported in the direction of Ituri, in the Eastern Province.

Special observations: group included on the list of organisations considered as terrorists by the US Department of State.

6.2 Patriotic Alliance for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS)

Background: APCLS claims to be a self-defence group originating from the Hunde population in the Masisi territory, in North Kivu. Led by General Janvier Buingo Karairi (ex-PARECO and ex-ANR), APCLS is one of the groups created from the splitting up in around 2008 of PARECO (Coalition of Congolese Patriotic Resistance), which was a multi-ethnic group created to fight against the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) and opposed to the policy of *mixage* by the Congolese government[29]. PARECO was made up of three main factions (Hutu, Nande and Hunde). The Hunde faction – the first to form a new armed group after the split up of PARECO – accounts for the majority of APCLS members, whilst the others regrouped under the names of Nyatura and PARECO-Lafontaine/UPCP.

In 2013, the group was involved mainly in clashes with NDC/Cheka and different factions of Nyatura (especially, in October-November, around Kibarizo-Muhanga, in the west of Kitchanga). In early 2013, a section of APCLS under the leadership of Musa Jumapili was going to integrate FARDC in Kitchanga but this process was halted due to strong tensions between APCLS and the 812th FARDC regiment deployed in Kitchanga under the leadership of Colonel Mudahunga (ex-CNDP). These tensions degenerated into clashes causing 80 deaths.

At the end of the year, the leaders of APCLS again mooted the possibility of integrating FARDC, to which it has always been closely affiliated (apart from skirmishes with ex-CNDP components). It sometimes presented itself as a simple "support force" to government troops[30].

Leadership: General Janvier Buingo Karairi (sometimes spelt Kalahili), Division Commander.

Number of members: no precise figures recorded but no more than 1000 combatants, including the forces acting in proxy to FARDC. Since 2012, the group appears to have increased recruitment, citing danger from M23 as justification. The creation of Nyatura in 2012, despite the fact that the group is mainly made up of ex-PARECO combatants, created a feeling of insecurity, which encouraged recruitment of combatants from within the Hunde community[31].

Hierarchy: APCLS is made up of different battalions. Its High Command is located not far from Lukweti (between Nyabiondo and Pinga, in North-West Masisi territory). In addition to General Buingo Karairi, other main APCLS figures include: Colonel Innocent Balume, Colonel Innocent Dunga, Colonel Felix, Colonel Mustapha, Colonel Jeff Dunia (Executive Secretary of the Movement), Colonel Karara Mukandirwa, Colonel Musa Jumapili, Major Mapendo, Commander Tatutatu, Colonel Kambusi, Lt.-Colonel Menelik, Major Didas, Major Gédéon and Commander Ezekiel.

29 See Stearns 2013, *PARECO*.
30 Interview with Janvier Buingo and the Chief of Staff of APCLS, November 2013.
31 See United Nations Security Council (2012): *Letter to the President of the Security Council from the Secretary General of the United nations (S/2012/843)*. New York: United Nations.

Its political representatives are mainly Jean-Marc Cardinal (President of the Movement), Polycarpe Kubuya (Vice-President of the Movement) and Augustin Fundi (Second Vice-President and spokesperson). These three men, recognised by General Janvier, deny all links with the political party called APCLS, headed by Hangi Binini Vumilia, stating that Vumilia's group is a faction without a military wing.

Alliances: cohabitation with FDLR (shared checkpoints in 2012) in Northern Masisi, alliances with some Nyatura (FDDH in particular) and UPCP (ex-PARECO).

Networks and main support: strong support by the Hunde population and politicians, cohabitation with FDLR based in North-Masisi. Cordial relations with the non-rwandophone/non-ex-CNDP within FARDC.

Types of operations: their distrust of aid workers means that they set up many checkpoints but few attacks have been recorded. Huge clashes with NDC/Cheka since mid-2013 in Pinga and against FARDC (led by Colonel Mudahunga) in Kitchanga. The APCLS states that it made a decisive contribution in the victory against M23 in October-November 2013, by fighting alongside the FARDC during operations in the "Three Towers" area of Kibati.

Location (late 2013): North(-West) Masisi. Headquarters located in Lukweti, presence in Masisi, Nyabiondo, as far as Kalembe. The group occupied the town of Pinga for a while, before being driven away by NDC/Cheka[32].

Special observations: APCLS is a member of the Supreme Council of Native Armed Groups of Eastern DRC (see box below). The group developed a nationalist ideology, based on the defence of the Hunde community from what it calls "colonisation" of the country by Rwanda. The claims relate mainly to land issues.

Some sources indicate that similar to other armed groups in Eastern DRC, APCLS is recruiting children for a number of military and non-military tasks[33].

Humanitarian access to APCLS-held areas is possible, even though incidents of harassment and intimidation towards non-Hunde employees have been reported.

An alliance between enemies? The example of the Supreme Council of Native Armed Groups of Eastern DRC (CSGA-EST)

In mid-September 2013, some armed groups – mainly based in the Masisi territory and surrounding areas – met to create a political and military alliance called the Supreme Council of Native Armed Groups of Eastern DRC. The signatories to the declarations made by the said Council are mainly: APCLS (military wing and political party), Mai Mai Kifuafua, NDC/Cheka, FDC-Guides, Mai Mai Shetani-FPD, MAC, Raia Mutomboki of South Kivu (branch not specified), Raia Mutomboki in Walikale, Mai Mai Simba in Maniema and FRPI in Ituri.

This is an interesting alliance because it brings together armed groups that would normally be considered as adversaries: APCLS vs. NDC, FDC vs. MAC or even Mai Mai Kifuafua vs. Raia Mutomboki in Walikale. This surprising coalition can probably be explained by one (temporary) common objective: the claim by the armed groups in the East of participating in national consultations organised by the Congolese government in September 2013.

32 See Vogel 2013, *Mapping*.
33 Overview of the human rights situation amongst armed groups by a humanitarian organisation in 2013 (confidential document).

6.3 Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR-FOCA)

Background: the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) is made up of former members of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and the *Interahamwe* who took part in the 1994 genocide. It also includes combatants who didn't participate and were recruited after 1994 from the refugee camps in Zaire. According to some analyses, recent recruits make up most of the movement's combatants[34]. The name, FDLR, was adopted in 2000, officially replacing the name, Army for the Liberation of Rwanda (ALiR), under which a section of ex-FAR members who make up the FDLR today became notorious[35].

The practices, profile of combatants and even the geographical location of ALiR/FDLR have evolved since their arrival in the East at the end of the 90s. Their presence in the East for over twenty years has enabled them to deploy significant commercial networks. At the same time, they have been targeted by various military operations conducted initially by FARDC soldiers (between 2005 and 2007), then jointly by the Congolese and Rwandan armed forces ("Umoja Wetu" in 2008 and "Kimia II" in 2009) and finally by the FARDC and MONUC/MONUSCO ("Amani Leo", from 2011 to 2012, now directly integrated into the division of FARDC operations).

Leadership: Major-General Sylvestre Mudacumura, Major-General Victor Byinringiro

Hierarchy:

FOCA: Maj.-General Sylvestre Mudacumura (Commander in Chief), Major-General Victor Byinringiro (Interim President), General Gaston Iyamuremye aka Rumuli, Colonal Léon Mujyambere aka Achille, Colonel Pacifique Ntawunguka aka Omega/Israel (Commander North Kivu), Colonel Stanislas Gakwerere (Second-in-Command North Kivu), Colonel Hamada Habimana (Commander South Kivu), Colonel Serge Kashirabake, Colonel Jean-Baptiste Gakwerere aka Esdras Kaleb, Colonel Kalume, Colonel Amri Bizimana, Colonel Serge, Colonel Heritier Masisi, Colonel Martin, Colonel Blaise, Colonel Bonheur, Ignace Murwanashyaka (on trial), Callixte Mbarushimana (Executive Secretary), Straton Musoni (on trial), General Stanislas Nzeyimana Bigaruka (under arrest).

Splinter groups: FDLR-Soki in Rutshuru and RUD-Urunana in Lubero split from FOCA in 2005-7:

Soki: Colonel Soki (killed by M23 in July 2013), Colonel Kasongo (new leader)
RUD-Urunana: Brigadier General Jean Damascene Ntibabagije aka Musare, Félicien Kanyamibwa, Captain Kazungu

Number of members: in 2003, MONUC had between 8 000 and 12 000 ALiR combatants[36] whilst the Rwandan government spoke of between "10 000 and 60 000"[37]. By 2013 there were no more than between 1500 and 2500 men divided between North and South Kivu, according to MONUSCO – 5000 according to the Rwandan government.[38]

Alliances: Some Nyatura, some FARDC, some APCLS.

Networks and main support: diaspora and relatives in the area.

Types of operations: raids in villages; guerrilla tactics in FARDC/RDF and FARDC/MONUSCO joint operations against them; reprisals on civilians in response to attacks by Raia Mutomboki.

34 International Crisis Group (2003): *Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: A New Approach To Disarmament And Reintegration*. Africa *Report N°63*. Brussels: ICG, p. 4.
35 Ibid, pp. 5-6. The establishment of the FDLR in 2000 marked the combination of the ALiR and representatives of a more moderate opposition army.
36 United Nations Security Council (2002): *Letter to the President of the Security Council from the Secretary General of the United Nations (S/2002/341)*. New York: United Nations, p. 5.
37 International Crisis Group 2003, *The Rebels*, p. 5.
38 United Nations Security Council (2013): *Letter to the President of the Security Council from the Secretary General of the United Nations (S/2013/433)*. New York: United Nations, §97.

Location (late 2013): North Kivu: Masisi, Walikale, South-Lubero (where their HQ is said to be located), Rutshuru (Binza, Mutanda and Kanyabayonga groups). South Kivu: Mwenga, Uvira, Kalehe.

Special observations: severely weakened in the past few years.

6.4 Union of Congolese Patriots for Peace (UPCP)
Union for the Rehabilitation of Democracy in Congo (URDC)

Background: created as "Mai Mai Lafontaine" (from the name of their leader, Kakule Sikuli "Lafontaine", a former FAC/FARDC member), this group became the Nande wing of PARECO, alongside the Hunde wing (now APCLS) and the Hutu wing (now Nyatura). After the demise of PARECO, Lafontaine created the FPC and then UPCP.

In 2013, the former FARDC member, Hilaire Kombi created Mai Mai Kombi, which became URDC soon after. In October 2013, rumours indicated that an alliance between Lafontaine and Kombi based on Nande networks was in the offing.

In early December 2013, some sources indicated that Hilaire Kombi was to surrender to FARDC and that Kakule Sikuli Lafontaine was in negotiations with FARDC in view of demobilisation. Simultaneously (in early December 2013), some members of his group distinguished themselves by carrying out abuses on populations in the Lusindi area (Lubero territory).

Leadership:

UPCP: General Kakule Sikuli "Lafontaine"

URDC: Colonel Hilaire Paluku Kombi

Number of members:

UPCP: 200-300

URDC: 300-400

Hierarchy:

UPCP: Lt.-Colonel Jean-Pierre Mushamuka Bahati, Captain Xavier Namegabe Cibacibaye, Lieutenant André Ngoy wa Ngoy aka Mobutu, Ngwasi Mulindagabo, Elias Mukiza Mushamalirwa, Achille Baliana, Ngabo Mulengero Andre Rusumba, Serge Biringanine Chabuini, Mushagalusha Kiyanga, Apollinaire Chigiho Mukanire, Fiston Birindwa Kadakala, Doegratias Mushi Ashamina Polepole, Innocent Amani Habanawema

URDC: Colonel Hilaire Kambale Kombi Paluku, Colonel Werrason, Colonel Eric Kenzo, Colonel David Lusenge, Lt.-Colonel Jacques Tahanga Nyoro Kasereka (ex-FARDC), Muhindo Kasebere.

Alliances: other ex-PARECO members, rumours of contacts with M23 and collaboration with FDLR.

Networks and main support: support from the Nande population and Nande politicians, such as Antipas Mbusa Nyamwisi.

Types of operations: pillaging and attacks on villages, some kidnappings.

Location (late 2013): Lubero, Beni. The UPCP/FPC HQ is located in Bunyatenge/Tama.

Special observations: collaboration between UPCP and URDC, possible merger underway. Militarily not very active in 2013. The UPCP is suspected of recruiting child soldiers.

6.5 Congolese Defence Force (FDC-Guides)
Action Movement for Change (MAC)

Background: Guides was founded around 2009 by Madragul, a community leader. Guides provided support for joint operations conducted by FARDC and the Rwandan Defence Forces against FDLR and then transformed into a real group, following FDLR reprisals.

Under the leadership of Butu Luanda, FDC-Guides was created, they maintained links with M23 and conducted attacks targeting FDLR bases (during which several FDLR Commanders were killed).

The group split into two in 2013, following discord between the pro- and anti-M23 wings. The anti-M23 wing became the MAC, whilst the pro-M23 wing remained as FDC. Since the split up, MAC has rarely launched any military operations.

Leadership:

FDC: General Butu Luanda, Colonel Katoboro

MAC: Colonel Bwira, Colonel Charles

Number of members:

FDC: 200

MAC: 200

Hierarchy:

FDC: General Butu Luanda, Colonel Katoboro

MAC: Colonel Bwira, Colonel Charles, Madragul Mbayirwe as political leader.

Alliances: ex-M23 (for FDC), Bosco Ntaganda.

Networks and main support: FDC enjoyed support from M23 and, according to some sources, from the Rwandan army in its anti-FDLR operations. The Guides appear to receive support mainly from the local population (Hunde and Tembo in particular).

Types of operations: during the FDC-Guides period, the group distinguished itself in attacks targeting FDLR camps (so-called "special operations"), which killed several of the latter's Commanders.

Location (late 2013): Walikale, Masisi (mainly Nyamaboko, Walowa and Ufamandu). HQ first located in Osso and then in Mahanga.

Special observations: MAC is a member of the Supreme Council of Native Armed Groups of Eastern DRC (see box above). There are rumours of large numbers of child soldiers in its ranks.

6.6 Front for the National Liberation (FNL)

Background: group created in 2002, originating from the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU, created in 1980 in Burundi). Today, FNL is opposed to those in power in Burundi, in particular, CNDD-FDD, the party of the incumbent President, Pierre Nkurunziza[39].

FNL signed a ceasefire in 2006 and officially transformed into a political party in 2009. In 2010, its historic leader, Agathon Rwasa, fled Burundi and took refuge in DRC, from where he maintained links with Mai Mai Yakutumba. The history of the Movement since then has been marked by constant infighting, which sometimes makes it difficult to identify its real representatives. In 2012, FNL split into two factions (one led by Aloys Nzabampema and the other by Antoine Bariyanka). Nzabampema, who joined the Burundian army in 2009, only to quit in 2010, announced in September 2012 that he was taking up arms again because of what he termed as the "extermination policy against FNL members" being carried out by those in power in Bujumbura.

In 2013, Agathon Rwasa returned to Burundi to prepare for the electoral campaign in 2015. His status within the Movement is unclear as a press release dated 15 January 2013 announced his removal from the post of President and his replacement by Isidore Nivisi. Nzabampema's men are said to still be in DRC, in the *Hauts Plateaux* of Uvira[40].

Leadership: General Antoine Bariyanka, General Aloys Nzabampema

Number of members: 400

Hierarchy:

Agathon Rwasa (returned to Burundi), General Antoine Bariyanka (aka Shuti), General Aloys Nzabampema (Commander, said to be in DRC), Colonel Innocent Ngendakuryo aka Nzarabu (Operations), Colonel Logatien Negamiye.

Alliances (on Congolese soil): Yakutumba/PARC-FAAL (ended in 2012). Although Mai Mai Fujo and MDP (ex-Mai Mai Baleke) have collaborated regularly in the past with the FNL operating in Uvira territory, they have always denied any formal alliance with the latter.

Types of operations: smuggling across lake Tanganyika (in Fizi territory), theft and pillaging in the Ruzizi Plain and *Hauts Plateaux* of Uvira (in Uvira territory).

Location (late 2013): Ubwari peninsula (in Fizi territory), Ruzizi Plain, *Hauts Plateaux* of Lemera, surrounding areas of Masango in the *Hauts Plateaux* of Uvira (Uvira territory).

Special observations: several safety incidents (theft, pillaging, etc.) in the Ruzizi Plain have been attributed by default to FNL combatants by the population (whereas the thefts and pillaging are sometimes carried out by common criminals, not affiliated to the group).

39 CRESA (2011): *Structure et modes de financement des groupes armés a l'est de la RD. Congo*. (*Structure and funding methods of armed groups in RDC)*. Bukavu: CRESA (confidential document)

40 Interviews with Mai Mai Fujo, MDP and Yakutumba/PARC-FAAL combatants, February 2013. See also: http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130115-burundi-agathon-rwasa-fln-rdc-zambie-aloys-nzabampema-and http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20120904-burundi-FNLC-aloys-nNzabampema-hostilites-agathon-rwasa

6.7 Mai Mai Kifuafua

Background: Mai Mai Kifuafua is a self-defence group originating from the border area between North and South Kivu (Masisi territories, Walikale and Kalehe). It became active in around 2001. The group, which recruits mainly from amongst the Tembo population, has had an eventful history, including a temporary change of name in 2012, during which they used the label of Raia Mutomboki.

The group has several times tried to integrate the FARDC (especially its former leaders, Delphin Mbaenda and Sadam Kimalumalu), but apart from being involved on a case by case basis, it has never really merged with the national army.

In December 2013, there were rumours of a possible rift within the group, between a section of troops remaining in Ufamando with Colonel Kirikicho and his Mai Mai and another section in Busurungi with General Delphin. This rift could be explained by the refusal of one section to recognise and apply ceasefire agreements signed earlier in Itebero.

Leadership: General Delphin Mbaenda, Lukenga Mamboleo (political branch).

Number of members: 100-200

Hierarchy:

Biofu Matata, Colonel Limenzi Kanganga, Colonel Mitabara, Didier Bitaki, Akili Bengele and Kilisemewa Kisoka.

Alliances: alternately in alliance with Nyatura and FDLR and then Raia Mutomboki (the movement that they temporarily merged with in 2012).

Networks and main support: mainly from the Tembo population.

Types of operations: clashes with Raia Mutomboki in Kalehe in 2013, despite sharing the same "community base" (the Tembo community) and skirmishes with Raia Mutomboki in Walikale (Itebero) in mid-2013, followed by peace negotiations.

Location (late 2013): the triangle between Walikale, Masisi and Kalehe (Ufamando, Walowa and Ziralo, in particular).

Special observations: the group is a member of the Supreme Council of Native Armed Groups of Eastern DRC (see box above). It has some very strong political claims (e.g., a national ministry, military ranks of General, etc.). However, it is somewhat unrealistic about the effective strength of the group. It is also heavily suspected of recruiting children.

6.8 Mai Mai Yakutumba (PARC-FAAL)

Background: this Movement was officially created in 2007, under the name, "Mai Mai Réformés", and was made up of former Mai Mai combatants and officers (mainly Bembe) from Fizi, who fought from 1998 to 2003 against the presence of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), claiming it was harmed by the integration process into FARDC.

It later became the Party for Action and Reconstruction of Congo – Forces Armées Alleluiah (PARC-FAAL) in 2011. To date, PARC has not yet been approved by the Congolese government.

In October 2009 and then from February to July 2013, the group started the integration process before pulling out of the process and resuming clashes against government forces.

Leadership: William Amuri Yakutumba, who commands the military wing of the Movement, started his career in 1996 in the Mai Mai militia of General Dunia, where he was Battalion Commander (just like his current Second-in-Command, Abwe Mapigano). The President of the political branch of the organisation, Raphael Looba Undji, was a "*candidat malheureux*" at the legislative elections in 2006.

Hierarchy:

William Amury Yakutumba ("Force Commander"), Abwe Mapigano (Second-in-Command), Ebuela Kitongano, Kizza Bavon (under arrest), Colonel Bwasakala, Kitoto Kizuri[41]. Political representation by Raphael Looba Undji. Some founding-members of PARC (e.g., Mayuto Sungura) act as liaison officers in different urban areas.

Number of members: one of the largest Mai Mai groups of South Kivu that continues to enjoy support (see section on "Networks and main support") but it was considerably weakened by the operations conducted against them by FARDC in 2012-2013 (FARDC states that it killed 17 members and arrested 55 combatants in August 2013[42], including Commander Aoci).

Alliances:

Mai Mai Bwasakala: operationally, a relatively independent branch of PARC-FAAL, based in Lulambwe, on the *Moyens Plateaux* of Mboko. Commanded by Bwasakala, a Mubembe from Kabundozi, who started his career in the 90s as batallion commander under the orders of General Mayele and claims to have around 300 combatants on his side.

Mai Mai Mayele: allies, but rocky relations between Mayele and Yakutumba, who both want to be recognised as the rightful leaders of the Mai Mai in Fizi territory. The group is mainly present around Swima and Ake II (between Uvira and Mboko), where its Commander, Rachid Mayele, resides.

MDLC: links with Mai Mai Mulumba, Aoci and Chochi (see section on "MDLC" below).

FNL: Mai Mai Yakutumba is widely believed to have been close allies with the Burundian FNL, which the leaders of the group have always denied[43].

Networks and main support: presence of significant support networks from civilians (Traditional Chiefs, small entrepreneurs, demobilised soldiers) providing logistical support and intelligence; funded through mining and by taxing various activities in Fizi territory (trade vehicles, etc…);

Types of operations: frequently involved in the theft of livestock and/or attacking shepherds during the annual migration period of cattle from the *Hauts Plateaux* of Minembwe to the Ngandja Plains and the banks of Lake Tanganyika. Two main incidents against aid workers have been attributed to them: the kidnapping of eight humanitarian workers near Kananda (Fizi territory) in April 2010; the assassination of seven local NGO employees near Central Fizi on 4 October 2011[44].

Location (late 2013): after a grouping of troops in Sebele, within the framework of the abortive merger with FARDC in early 2013, the group distinguished itself in clashes in the *Moyens Plateaux* of Mboko and in the city of Baraka in August-September 2013. Now weakened, its combatants are said to be currently (November 2013) retreating towards the Ngandja Valley, in the extreme south of the province.

41 See CRESA 2011, *Structures et modes (Structures and funding methods)*.

42 See http://radiookapi.net/regions/sud-kivu/2013/08/18/sud-kivu-les-fardc-arretent-55-combattants-yakutumba-apres-des-combats-fizi/ et http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/08/14/sud-kivu-17-Mai Mai-tues-dans-les-combats-baraka-selon-les-fardc/.

43 Interviews with PARC-FAAL combatants and commanders, March-April 2013. See also Stearns, Jason et al. (2013): *Mai Mai Yakutumba. Resistance and Racketeering in South Kivu*. London: Rift Valley Institute.

44 See http://www.rfi.fr/contenu/20100414-employes-cicr-enleves-est-rdc-le-chef-groupe-Mai Mai-s-explique-rfi and http://www.hrw.org/fr/news/2012/10/04/rd-congo-la-justice-se-fait-toujours-attendre-un-apr-s-une-attaque-caract-re-ethniqu

A political alliance between the Mai Mai of North and South Kivu? The People's Coalition for the Sovereignty of Congo (CNPSC)

Since 2010, North and South Kivu have seen the creation of a plethora of "alliances" and "coalitions" between Congolese armed groups (Mai Mai, in particular). These coalitions and alliances are often ephemeral, with little tangible existence beyond a few statements (see also box on "CSGA-EST"). However, there are two alliances worth mentioning. Although still little known, MDLC is the political "umbrella" for a number of former operational collaborators (between the Mai Mai Aoci, Chochi and Mulumba, in particular). Details are given in section 6.10. of this report.

The second, and focus of this box, is the People's Coalition for the Sovereignty of Congo (CNPSC). This coalition is part of an uncommon alliance between Mai Mai in North and South Kivu. Interestingly, its existence was confirmed to the authors by reliable representatives of each group concerned. Created in 2013, its aim is essentially political (it does not involve any operational alliance), and the goal of these groups is to have a common platform in political negotiations with the Congolese government.

The alliance consists mainly of:

- APCLS of Janvier Buingo;
- PARC-FAAL (Mai Mai Yakutumba);
- FPC (Mai Mai Bwasakala);
- Biloze Bishambuke (Mai Mai Chochi);
- FPCP (Mai Mai Aoci).

Raia Mutomboki Shabunda (Jean Musumbu's group) also joined the alliance before laying down its arms in July 2013.

6.9 Congolese Movement for Change (MCC)

Background: The Congolese Movement for Change (MCC) was created by Bede[45] Rusagara. He is a former Mai Mai of Fulero origin who joined the CNDP in 2006 and is alledged to have had links with M23 – something that he has always denied. The group now calls itself the Congolese Coalition for Liberation (CCL) but is still mainly known by its former name of MCC[46]. It was targeted in joint FARDC-MONUSCO operations, "Kamilisha Usalama", from July/August 2013 to early December 2013[47].

Leadership: General Bede Rusagara, Colonel Emmanuel Bigaya. Colonel Safari, who controlled the Sange axis, was killed by the FARDC on 10 December 2013.

Alliances: good relations with Mai Mai Fujo; fluctuating relations with MDP (ex-Mai Mai Baleke).

Networks / support: the customary chief of the Bafulero Bike Rusagara, is said to be close to MCC.

Location (late 2013): Ruzizi Plain, in particular in the surrounding areas of Mutarule. Retreated towards the *Moyens Plateaux* after joint operations against them.

45 Also spelled "Bedy".

46 Interview with Bede Rusagara, February 2013 and "Terms and Conditions for the Congolese Coalition for Liberation and the Congolese Liberation Forces", December 2012.

47 CIRESKI (2013): *La Peur Change de Camp en Territoire d'Uvira au Sud-Kivu* (*Fear changes sides in Uvira territory in South Kivu*). *113/CR-SK/Dir./2013*. Uvira: CIRESKI.

6.10 Defence Movement for the Liberty of Congo (MDLC)

Background: a political and military coalition formed in 2012, made up of a section of the Movement for the Defence of the People (MDP, ex Mai Mai Baleke), Mai Mai Mulumba, Mai Mai Aoci, Mai Mai Chochi (also known as Biloze Bishambuke) and various self-defence groups from Masango in the *Hauts Plateaux* of Uvira (the Local Defence headed by Kashumba, a close ally of Fujo Zabuloni and the self-defence group headed by Ilunga Ruseseni).

Movement for the Defence of the People (MDP, ex Mai Mai Baleke): a political and military Movement created in 2011 by Baleke "Westman" Sumaili. Baleke, originating from Kitundu, in Uvira territory, was a Mai Mai in the brigade of Baudouin Nakabaka from 1996 to 2004, when he joined FARDC. He deserted from FARDC in 2011 to create the MDP alongside Bede Rusagara. However, due to dissensions with the latter, they soon split up, with Baleke remaining at the head of MDP whilst Bede went on to create his own Movement called MCC. Baleke was killed by rocket fire at the end of 2012 – there are different versions about his death, some sources say the rocket fire came from FARDC, with others claiming it was the Burundian FNL that fired the shot. Since his death, his son, Patrick, has been the President of the Movement, which is not really operational in the field anymore (its combatants seem to have migrated to the groups led by Bede Rusagara and Fujo Zabuloni).

Mai Mai Mulumba: the group (it is said to have about one hundred permanent combatants) operates mainly in the North-West of Fizi territory (around the Kagembe Plateau, in the Basimunyaka-South groupement, in Lulenge sector). These "self-defence" forces first mobilised in Lulenge in 1996, with the aim of fighting against AFDL. They rapidly became notorious for their attacks on livestock. Mulumba is said to be over 70 years old now.

Mai Mai Aoci: this group is mainly present in the south of Mwenga territory (around Ibashilo, in the Itombwe groupement) and has sometimes been spotted around Kihungwe (in the extreme West of Fizi territory), where its combatants steal cows as their main activity. They are theoretically a brigade of Mai Mai Yakutumba but in reality, their geographical remoteness means that its leadership structure is very loose. They call themselves a self-defence force opposed to FRF, a group of mainly Banyamulenge combatants in the *Hauts Plateaux* of Minembwe (until the latter integrated the Congolese army in January 2011). They have close links with FDLR in their area of influence and with Mai Mai Mulumba. Their commander, Kakozi Behekelwa "Aoci" (Mubembe), was arrested by FARDC during operations against Mai Mai Yakutumba in mid-August 2013.

Mai Mai Chochi (also called "Biloze Bishambuke"): the group was created in 2012, with the declared objective of fighting against the theft of cattle owned by Fulero farmers (by Mai Mai Yakutumba in particular). They now collaborate with PARC-FAAL. Most of its troops are based in Milimba, where most of its combatants come from. Its Commander, Chochi (Munyindu), in his fifties, was an escort to General Dunia in Sowe in the 90s and then became S3 (Head of Operations) in the Assani Ngungu / Braun group in the 2000s. During merger with the latter in 2010, he decided to demobilise but then went underground again in 2012 (when the civilian administrator in Minembwe ordered his arrest for his role in the conflict with Banyamulenge farmers.)

In October 2013, the political representatives of the Movement started discussions with the 10th Military District in view of a possible integration into FARDC.

Leadership: Colonel Kazadi (died in December 2013 and has not yet been replaced at the time this report was being written), Fidèle Somora (President of the political branch).

Alliances: Mai Mai Mulumba and Aoci are theoretically part of PARC-FAAL, under the leadership of William Amuri Yakutumba. Even though their geographical remoteness means that both groups run highly independent operations, their links are occasionally re-activated in operations against FARDC and/or during negotiations with the government, as was the case in early 2013[48].

Location (late 2013): political branch based in Uvira. Troops mainly grouped in Lulenge (Fizi territory).

6.11 March 23 Movement (M23)

Background: Until early November 2013, M23 was one of the most structured and organised armed groups in Eastern DRC. As was the case of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP) led by General Laurent Nkundabatware before the creation of M23, the latter represents mainly, but not exclusively, the Tutsi population in Congo (Banyajomba, part of Banyabwisha and other clans, such as the Bagogwe of Bosco Ntaganda).

Like its predecessors, M23 gets popular support from the areas surrounding Rutshuru, Kiwanja, Bunagana, Jomba, Rumangabo (Rutshuru territory), Kilolirwe and Kitchanga (Masisi territory, not controlled by M23 in 2013) but the Movement has never been able to attract any real sympathy from the civilian population. Even though hundreds of defections (mainly ex-NCDP and ex-PARECO) from FARDC enabled the creation of M23, the Banyamulenge population of South Kivu, for example, has never joined the Movement.

Created in May 2012 by Sultani Makenga, following a wave of defections triggered by the fleeing of Bosco Ntaganda, who was under threat of arrest on the orders of President Kabila, the Movement quickly grouped together in the sub-area of Runyoni, Tshanzu and Jomba (in the East of the town of Rutshuru). Up to July-August 2012, M23 had captured the strategic towns of Bunagana (border town with the Uganda), Rutshuru (administrative headquarters of the homonymous territory) and Rumangabo (FARDC military base)[49].

In November, M23 succeeded in taking control of Goma for ten days, with FARDC on the run. Put under pressure by the international community, M23 left Goma to establish a front between the villages of Munigi and Kibati, a few kilometres North. During the first half of 2013, the situation dragged on slowly and discussions in Kampala got bogged down. In February, M23 split into two rival factions (see below). In July 2013, FARDC, helped by the MONUSCO Intervention Brigade, launched a series of offensives and under the leadership of General Bahuma and Colonel Ndala, succeeded in dislodging M23 from their positions. They made their way further up north (up to Kibumba), before opening up a second front from Kiwanja in October. Heavy clashes (including helicopter attacks and the use of snipers) forced M23 to withdraw to its original positions around the hills of Tshanzu and Runyoni, before being driven towards Uganda in early November 2013. On 5 November, M23 unilaterally declared the end of its armed struggle[50].

Leadership: Brigadier General Sultani Makenga, Bertrand Bisimwa (political branch).

Number of members: around 800-1300 combatants before the clashes in August with FARDC/FIB-MONUSCO. It probably had between 400 and 450 armed combatants at the time of its surrender in early November 2013. The group was modelled on a conventional army, like FARDC or RDF.

48 See http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/08/09/sud-kivu-6-groupes-armes-duvira-souhaitent-integrer-les-fardc/
49 See United Nations Security Council 2013, *S/2013/433.*
50 See the "Declaration of the End of Rebellion", signed by Bertrand Bisimwa.

Hierarchy: it was divided into several brigades (7-8) until November 2013, but it is difficult to specify who the Commanders were and where they were located because several battles influenced their setup. Its core was organised around Sultani Makenga. Its main leaders were Sultani Makenga (Commander in Chief), Colonel Innocent Kayina (alias India Queen), Colonel Vianney Kazarama, Colonel Yusuf Mboneza and its political representatives, Bertrand Bisimwa, Roger Lumbala, Amani Kabasha and René Abandi. After the rift between the Makenga camp ("Kifuafua" of M23) and "Kimbelembele" headed by General Bosco Ntaganda in late February 2013, the latter, along with Colonels Baudouin Ngaruye, Innocent Zimurinda, Alex Masozera and Eric Badege and Seraphin Mirindi, Jean-Marie Runiga and François Rucogoza left the Movement[51].

Alliances: sporadic alliances with NDC/Cheka (in particular, through Bosco Ntaganda), URDC/Kombi, UPCP/Lafontaine, Mai Mai Morgan, the group headed by Erasto Ntiburana and, according to certain sources, ex-FDLR members headed by Colonel Mandevu.

There were attempts to forge alliances with other groups, especially in South Kivu with MCC/Bede, the Muhima Nkingi group (through Bede), UFRC headed by Gustave Bagayamukwe (now under arrest and held in detention in Kinshasa) and Raia Mutomboki headed by Colonel Albert Kahasha alias "Foka Mike", but to no avail.

Networks and main support: there were several claims of support from Neighbouring States (Rwanda and Uganda mainly), especially in 2012. There were also rumours of possible collaboration/cohabitation between certain FARDC regiments headed by ex-NCDP Commanders that had not participated in the mutiny that had led to the creation of M23.

Funding came from local taxation, trading and from various forms of trafficking in collaboration with traders. On the other hand, they were not directly involved in mining, apart from levying taxes. A tax of several hundreds of US dollars levied on each truck of goods passing through their area of control suggests that M23 revenue was vast, even without direct access to the gold, coltan and tin mines[52].

Types of operations: known for its disciplined structure, the group sometimes behaved like a conventional army but also adopted guerrilla tactics. It started out as being a very united group but gradually fell apart following the rift in early 2013 (see above). Although there is no evidence implicating them directly in any attacks against humanitarian workers, M23 was accused several times of impeding access to humanitarian workers.

Location (late 2013): until October 2013, the group controlled almost all of the Bwisha community in Rutshuru territory, in North Kivu. It also had significant bases in Rumangabo, Bunagana (Political HQ), Rutshuru and Tshanzu (Military HQ). Northern limits: Kiwanja and Mabenga and Katweguru and Nyamilima. Eastern limits: Rwandan and Ugandan borders. Southern limits: around Kibumba and Rugari. Western limits: along the Virunga park. M23 does not currently hold any area on DRC soil.

Special observations: M23 was long deemed to be one of the most disciplined, non-state armed actor, with an *esprit de corps* inherited from the ex-NRM, RPF and the ex-CNDP/RCD but also due to a military training superior to much of FARDC. Both its leadership and rank-and-file soldiers appeared to be very knowledgeable of International Humanitarian Law and humanitarian principles. The movement, mainly through its political branch, had a very detailed ideology and political agenda, based mainly on demanding the application of the March 23 2009 Agreement between the DRC and the various armed groups[53]. However, the group received constant accusations of recruiting child-soldiers and forced recruitment.

51 See Vogel 2013, *Mapping*.
52 See Stearns 2013, *From CNDP to M23*.
53 Interview with Sultani Makenga, April 2013.

6.12 Nduma Defence of Congo (NDC)/Mai Mai Cheka

Background: created in June 2009 from a network of FARDC (in particular, the 85th brigade headed by Colonel Sammy Matumo, who controlled the cassiterite mine in Bisie) to destabilise ex-NCDP FARDC combatants (the 212th brigade) who took advantage of their integration and subsequently had taken back control of the mineral trade in the Walikale territory in favour of their integration. In August 2009, in cooperation with FDLR combatants, they participated in the assassination of around thirty workers in the Bisie mine[54]. From 30 July to 2 August 2010, they pillaged the villages located between Kibua and Luvungi, during which between 300 and 400 people were subjected to sexual violence, according to Human Rights Watch[55]. In November 2013, Cheka announced that it was ready to merge its troops with FARDC and PNC, subject to certain conditions (in particular, the recognition of military ranks)[56]. Some of its members (including six officers) were sent to Bweremana. However, a few weeks later, Cheka fled from Pinga, apparently fearing an attack on his positions by FARDC and/or the FIB of MONUSCO[57].

Leadership: Ntabo Ntaberi Cheka (currently wanted by the Congolese government for crimes against humanity), of Nyanga origin, was a former mineral merchant for the company called "MPC". He had no military experience prior to June 2009 but had access to a solid network of informants. He was an unsuccessful candidate at the legislative elections held in 2011 (during which he supported the presidential majority).

Number of members: although quite limited, it appears to be able to conduct relatively substantial operations, thanks to their alliances and access to equipment (see the section on "Networks and main support"). The group is said to have had thirty-two officers and around one hundred combatants in 2011[58].

Hierarchy

- Ntabo Ntaberi Cheka, Colonel Guido Shimiray (Second-in-Command), Colonel Eric (currently in Bweremana), Colonel Costa (Misao axis), Colonel Gilbert Bwira, Colonel Alba, Lt.-Colonel Foudre Panda, Major Faustin, Shimiray Muisa (political branch), Sadoke Kikunda Mayele (Chief of Staff, arrested on 5 October 2010), Bosco Katende (spokesperson, arrested on 4 August 2011).

Alliances

2009-2011: FDLR ("Montana" battalion under the command of Lt.-Colonel Evariste "Sadiki" Kwanzeguhera and men led by Captain Séraphin Lionso) but the coalition was dissolved in November 2011, when Cheka assassinated Sadiki. It was also in an alliance at the time with the group led by Emmanuel Nsengiyumva, ex-NCDP (and FARDC deserter) linked to FPLC.

Since 2011: contacts with Akilimali (Mai Mai Kifuafua) in 2011. Alliance with Bosco Ntaganda (since mid-2011) and then with M23. Cheka helped Ntaganda during his mutiny and conducted attacks, with the help of ex-NCDP fighters, against FARDC in Walikale (including the attack that led to the death of Colonels FARDC Chuma and Pilipili on 17 April 2012)[59].

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54 See United Nations Security Council (2009): *Letter to the President of the Security Council from the Secretary General of the United nations (S/2009/603)*. New York: United Nations

55 See Human Rights Watch (2010): *Rogue leaders, Rebels forcibly recruit youth*. London: Human Rights Watch (http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/12/20/dr-congo-rogue-leaders-rebels-forcibly-recruit-youth)

56 See NDC Terms and Conditions (available from the authors) and http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2013/11/09/nord-kivu-sheka-demande-lamnistie-lintegration-de-sa-milice-dans-larme/.

57 Interview with NDC/Cheka combatants, November 2013.

58 See United Nations Security Council (2011): *Letter to the President of the Security Council from the Secretary General of the United nations (S/2011/738)*. New York: United Nations

59 See United Nations Security Council (2012): *Letter to the President of the Security Council from the Secretary General of the United nations (S/2012/348)*. New York: United Nations (plus addendum S/2012/348/Add.1) and United Nations Security Council 2011, *S/2011/738.*

Networks and main support

- Ntaberi Cheka is said to be the nephew of Étienne Bindu (former second in Command of FARDC's 8th Military Region, today a General without portfolio in Kinshasa), originating from Walikale that is said to have been behind Cheka since the start of his Movement and in particular, while he had the role of Second in Command of the 8th Military District;
- Cheka is also said to have benefited from the tolerance of the Commander of FARDC's 212th brigade, Colonel Yusuf Mboneza (close to Makenga) in 2010;
- Links with the mining company, Geminaco;
- More generally, the group has enjoyed support within the Nyanga community, who believe that, despite any "harassment" he may have caused, the NDC has enabled the local population of Walikale to take back control of the mines from the hands of FDLR and to establish a degree of protection against FDLR and APCLS incursions[60].

Types of operations

2010: operations against mining sites and shopping centres. Rape, kidnappings, forced labour and pillaging.

2011: no pillaging reported but NDC combatants suffered heavy losses during APCLS attacks in June. They still collect taxes around mining sites.

2013: attacks aimed at APCLS/Janvier intensified around the month of October (heavy fighting in Pinga).

Location (late 2013): headquarters located in Mubi and Pinga (Walikale territory) until November 2013; uncertainty since. Operational in Ihana, Ikobo, Usala and in Utunda communities, in particular.

Special observations: in late 2010, NDC was mentioned by Human Rights Watch (HRW) as one of the groups recruiting child soldiers.

6.13 Nyatura (Nyatura, FDDH/M26, FDIPC, FODP, MPA, Noeri)

Background: Nyatura is a collection of armed groups recruiting mainly from within the Congolese Hutu population and mainly based in the Masisi territory in North Kivu. Formerly part of PARECO, Nyatura rapidly splintered into a number of sub-groups. In late 2013, the following structures prevailed: Nyatura, Force for the Defence of Human Rights (FDDH)/M26, FODP and Konjonjo in Masisi and FDIPC (in the process of demobilisation since October 2013) and MPA in Rutshuru territory. The dangers posed by the presence of Raia Mutomboki for the Hutu populations in South-Masisi are one of the reasons for the emergence of groups such as Nyatura. Another reason is the political aspirations of some of their leaders and the management of land disputes.

In November 2013, FDIPC officially declared the end of its armed struggle. In December 2013, first Colonel Noeri and then Colonel Kasongo (FDDH) both surrendered to FARDC.

Leadership: the Movement is torn by numerous battles between the leaders of the different sub-groups, which make it impossible for Nyatura to speak of a united leadership. There is, however, Colonel Habarugira, who was once an important figure in the Movement before its merger with FARDC in 2012. See the "Hierarchy" section below for information on other leaders,.

Number of members: a few hundred at most per sub-group but no more than 1500 overall.

60 Interviews with NDC combatants and local authorities in Walikale territory, November 2013.

Hierarchy:

Konjonjo: Colonel Bigembe Turinkinko (ex Mai Mai Mongol/PARECO, in Katoyi), Colonel Matias Kalume Kage (in North Kalehe territory), Colonel B(izag)wira Muhindi, Colonel Ma(n)gara, Colonel Ndume.

FDDH: Colonel Emmanuel Munyamariba (ex Mai Mai Mongol, in Lushebere), Colonel Delta Dusabe, Colonel Kapopi, Major Jata, Colonel Kasongo Kalamo (in a merger process with FARDC since December 2013), Clément Kamanutsi (Second in Command to Kasongo).

FODP and/or Vutura: Colonel Freddy Muchoma, Colonel Safari Kainamua, Major Tegamaso Kamanzi and Colonel Kabulembo.

FDIPC: Jackson Baharunye, Colonel Claude.

MPA: Colonel Ndagijimana Basabose, Major Bishirwa.

Integrated Nyatura: Colonel Habarugira, leader of the troops semi-integrated into the army since late 2012, probably based in Mushake.

Noeri: once close to Kasongo Kalamo (see FDDH) who had created his own group, entered the merger process with FARDC in December 2013.

Alliances: alliances of circumstance with some FDLR (between Mweso-Kalembe, for example) and with FARDC – with which a number of Nyatura have partially merged. Members of various *ad-hoc* coalitions, such as the so-called "Safina" coalition (also known as anti-M23), which was created in early 2013 between FDC-Guides, APCLS and Nyatura/FDDH (inactive ever since).

Networks and main support: Nyatura is the armed wing of the Congolese Hutu populations. Its various factions are supported by local politicians, including Robert Seninga, Bigembe and Munyamariba. The civilian administrator in Nyamitaba (Masisi territory), Emmanuel Munyamariba, has long wielded influence within these communities but claims he resigned from his role as FDDH coordinator at the end of 2013. The Movement also had links with the Presidency in Kinshasa. Nyatura are benefitting from a comparably high militarisation of the Hutu community in Masisi, wherefrom it mainly recruits its young combatants.

Types of operations: Nyatura is engaged mainly in attacks against ex-NCDP components of FARDC, M23 and other groups deemed as hostile to the Congolese Hutu community. It has sometimes been involved in skirmishes with FDC-Guides and APCLS. Its attacks are often aimed at villages, sometimes involving the theft of herds of cattle.

Location (late 2013): FDIPC and MPA in Northern Rutshuru territory, between Rutshuru, Nyamilima and Ishasha, where Mai Mai Shetani/FPD also operate. Subgroups maintaining the “Nyatura” label are mostly based towards the South-East of Masisi, while M26 and FODP/Vutura are located in the north central part of the same territory.

FDDH has been spotted in South Kivu, in Kalehe territory and in North Kivu: Mweso, Kitchanga and within the Ufamandu I, Ufamandu II and Kamuronza communities (Masisi territory).

Special observations: its many internal divisions, due mainly to competitiveness amongst its leaders, make the situation of this movement difficult to monitor. These divisions have led some Commanders to refuse to be labelled as Nyatura; such is the case of FDDH, led by Colonel Kasongo. The numerous divisions also endorsed the appearance of self-proclaimed political representatives (especially in Goma), who are not always recognised by its military wing and troops in the field.

6.14 Raia Mutomboki / Mukombozi (Shabunda)

Background: Raia Mutomboki (Swahili for "angry citizens"), a Movement claiming self-defence, was created in the western part of South Kivu and recruits mainly from the Rega[61] population. The history of Raia Mutomboki started in 2005-6, around the figure of Jean Musumbu, a spiritual healer living in the south of the Shabunda territory. He created the Movement to counter attacks by the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). Although Musumbu's group didn't continue its operations for a long time, it did serve as a model for a multitude of new satellites or Raia Mutomboki "franchises" starting from 2011-12. In the last two years, the Raia Mutomboki based in Shabunda and headed by Eyadema Mugugu (currently in prison in Kinshasa), "Juriste" Kikuni, but also Sisawa Kindo, Donat Kengwa and Ngandu Lundimu, were deemed to have the most significant and active group within this movement[62].

Since mid-2013, the dynamics of Raia Mutomboki has taken a new turn. The Shabunda-based group has evolved considerably, with a central core remaining around Kikuni and Albert Mutima, whilst other influential Commanders moved on to establish new alliances. The "Raia Mukombozi coalition" ("Citizens, let's liberate ourselves", in Swahili), created in June 2013 and based in Isezya (North-eastern Shabunda territory), is the most note-worthy. It includes Daniel Meshe (President), Deo Bizibu Balola (Vice-President) and Albert Kahasha, alias "Foka Mike" (former UPC and Mudundu 40). However, it is split by divergences with a Raia Mukombozi group, based in Kigulube and structured around General Donat Kengwa Omari, who declared the coalition as illegitimate[63]. In November 2013, some leaders of the coalition (including Daniel Meshe and Albert Kahasha) surrendered to the FARDC and, at the time this report was being written, were still in Kinshasa awaiting negotiations with the government. Donat Kengwa Omari's group may follow suit within the next few months.

Hierarchy:

Raia Mukombozi coalition (Isezya and surrounding areas): Daniel Meshe (President), Deo Bizibu Balola (Vice-President), Pierre Muamba Mabaya (spokesperson), Ngandu Lundimu (Chief of Staff General)[64], Albert Kahasha alias Foka Mike (Deputy Chief of Staff), Mabala Mese Salama (Kigulube), Maheshe Kahasha, Wangozi Pascal Sisawa Kindo, Constant Dindja

"Kigulube" branch: Donat Kengwa (Kigulube), "Charlequin" (in Mulungu, Baliga community), Makombo (ditto).

"Nduma" branch: Watuta Kikukama “Eyadema Mugugu” (detained in Kinshasa), Juriste Kikuni (new leader, based in the Bamuguba-North community), Albert Mutima Muba, Faustin Muzumbi Lubula, Pascal Musombwa.

"Nyandarema" branch: Commander Balene Murangwa. Note: Nyanderema, whose group controls the Lubimbe II checkpoints in western Chulwe, is close to Commanders based in Kigulube.

Number of members: very difficult to estimate due to the sometimes vague status of its combatants (ad-hoc mobilisation of civilians), it ranges from several hundreds to a few thousands.

Alliances: varied, highly localised, with MPs (or other politicians) and customary leaders.

Networks and main support: strong popular support, most combatants are simple "civilians" (without military training) who have taken up arms.

61 Sometimes spelt "Lega".

62 Interviews with Donat Kengwa and Ngandu Lundimu, November 2013. Also see Stearns, Jason et al. (2013): *Raia Mutomboki. The flawed peace process and the birth of an armed franchise*. London: Rift Valley Institute.

63 Interviews with Donat Kengwa, Ngandu Lundimu, Deo Bizibu Balola, Daniel Meshe and Albert Kahasha, November 2013.

64 Although General Ngandu Lundimu, based in Nzovu, appears amongst the signatories of the coalition (dated June 2013) and has been declared as the Chief of Staff by the coalition, he claims to be "apolitical" and appears to have good relations with Donat Kengwa.

Types of operations: some attacks against humanitarian workers carried out in 2011, 2012, 2013, but mainly brutal attacks against FDLR, Rwandan-speaking FARDC and their relatives.

Location (late 2013): northern part of Shabunda territory, beginning of the Kalehe and Mwenga territories.

Special observations: significant presence of child soldiers. Many Raia Mutomboki Commanders are FARDC deserters.

6.15 Raia Mutomboki (Kalehe/Bunyakiri)

Background: the Raia Mutomboki in Kalehe have their headquarters between Bunyakiri and Hombo, in Kalehe territory, where they were created as an "extension" to Raia Mutomboki in Shabunda. Most of their structures are based on former Mai Mai Padiri networks and recruitment is mainly from amongst the Tembo community in Kalehe[65].

Leadership: Bwale Hamakombo (coordinator)

Hierarchy: Bwale Hamakombo, Shukuru Kawaya (Head of Security in Bunyakiri-centre), Akili Abubakar (Bulo chefferie).

Number of members: a few hundreds; can be significantly boosted depending on circumstances.

Alliances: Nduma branch of Raia Mutomboki and the Kigubule branch of Raia Mukombozi (see section on Raia Mutomboki/Mukombozi in Shabunda). They collaborate sometimes with FARDC and they have some contacts with the Congolese Intelligence Agency (ANR).

Networks and main support: Tembo and Rega populations, ex-Mai Mai Tembo headed by General Padiri Bulenda.

Types of operations: offensives against FDLR in Kalehe territory since 2012, clashes with former FARDC units in Bunyakiri in 2012, clashes with Mai Mai Kifuafua in mid-2013.

Location (late 2013): mainly between Bunyakiri and Hombo.

Special observations: tensions between the Raia Mutomboki headed by Hamakombo and a Raia Mukombozi group based in Musenye (Maibano), under the command of Mweke Atobaibwa.

High level of child soldiers, combatants difficult to distinguish from the civilian population and groups of demobilised soldiers.

6.16 Raia Mutomboki (Walikale)

Background: the Walikale branch, the only significant faction of Raia Mutomboki in North Kivu, is the least known of the movement. It was a member of Raia Mutomboki under the leadership of Eyadema Mugugu ("Nduma" branch, in Shabunda territory) but it broke away after the arrest and detention of Eyadema in Kinshasa.

Leadership: Mwami Elenge Mwemano Jacob (political leader), Héritier Elenge (his brother, military leader).

Number of members: small in comparison with other Raia Mutomboki branches; 200-400 combatants, but this figure varies depending on operations.

Hierarchy: the main representatives of the group are Amisi Kipuka, Kisekelwa Katanda, Katanda

65 Interviews with Raia Mutomboki combatants in Kalehe, March-April 2013, November 2013.

Mukangamo, Sumba Tanganika, Shemitembe Bazungu, Commander Milabio.

Alliances: linked to the Raia Mutomboki / Mukombozi Movement in South Kivu. It had established a close alliance with the Nduma branch before the arrest of Eyadema Mugugu.

Networks and main support: presence in the gold mine of Bakano, support from within the Bakano collectivity.

Types of operations: clashes with Mai Mai Kifuafua, attacks on humanitarian workers in central Walikale in 2012 and against FDLR and rwandophone FARDC.

Location (late 2013): southern Walikale territory between Hombo-Walikale, in the Bakano, Isangi and Itebero sectors, in particular.

Special observations: significant presence of child soldiers. Member of the Supreme Council of Autochtonous Armed Groups of Eastern DRC.

7. Appendix II: Interview guide (members of armed groups)

Note: The aim of this interview guide is to give an overview of the main subjects covered by the authors in their interviews with members of the armed groups. Naturally, some points not included in the list may have been touched on during the interviews and, in some cases, some subjects that are included in the list, were not covered (due to time restrictions or the sensitivity of the subject).

I. The presence of humanitarian agencies in the group's area of operation

- Which NGOs are present in the area?
- To do what?
- Since when?
- From where?
- What differentiates them (in terms of objectives, identity, etc…)?

II. Relations with NGOs

- Do you know how to differentiate humanitarian / UN / other vehicles?
- Do you have any contacts with any NGO employees? If so, what is the nature of the contact?
- Has any group member ever worked for a local, national or international NGO?
- Has any group member ever benefitted from any training/awareness campaigns on humanitarian principles and/or International Humanitarian Law?
- Has the group ever encountered any problems with humanitarian workers? What type of problems and why?
- Has the group ever launched any attacks on humanitarian vehicles / staff? Why?

III. Appreciation of work carried out by NGOs

- What is your overall opinion about the work carried out by NGOs in the area?
- Is it negative or positive? Why?
- How neutral and impartial are the NGOs that operate in the area?
- What NGO practices appear to be unusual / wrong?
- Other comments

8. Appendix III: Questionnaire given to NGOs

Note: If more than one answer is possible, please highlight your choice in a distinct colour. Otherwise, put your answers in the boxes below the questions.
NGO PROFILE
Please specify the role of the person responding to this questionnaire within the NGO: • Head of Mission • Security officer • Other (specify):
Your organisation is: • a local / national / international NGO • religious / non-religious
Since when has it been operating in North and/or South Kivu?
What were your main areas of intervention in 2013?
What factors determined your choice of intervention area?
What sort of assistance do you provide in the areas?
Why has your organisation decided to focus on this type of assistance?
COORDINATION
What is the nature of your relations with other humanitarian workers operating in the same area?
What main problems relating to coordination have you encountered with them?
ACCESS TO THE AREA
What main access problems has your organisation encountered? Are some DRC-specific?
During your operations, do you ever have to breech any humanitarian principles and codes of conduct?
If so, why?
Can you cite a recent case where, despite questioning the ethical merits of the situation (regarding your independence, impartiality, etc.), you decided to intervene anyway?
Conversely, can you cite a recent case where you decided not to intervene, so as not to breech any principles?
SAFETY POLICY
Which armed groups are present in your areas of intervention?
What security measures do you take before embarking on any mission in areas with a significant presence of armed groups (apart from internal communication chains)? (several answers are possible) • Travel with an armed escort (MONUSCO or FARDC): Yes / No • Travel in convoy: Yes / No • Contact to state authorities: Yes / No • Contact to customary leader: Yes / No • Contact to armed groups: Yes / No • Other (specify):
How are your teams identified during missions?:

• White vehicle / vehicle of another colour • Logo of the organisation on the vehicle: Yes / No • Flag of the organisation on the vehicle: Yes / No • T-shirts and/or caps/beenies of the organisation worn by staff: Yes / No • Other (specify):
RELATIONS WITH ARMED GROUPS
(Where applicable) Do you think that armed groups operating in your area of intervention are aware of the Humanitarian Guideline Principles (impartiality, neutrality, independence, etc.)? What groups appear to be best/least informed?
Do you think that the armed groups know the identity, objectives and principles of your organisation, in particular? If not, why?
Has any armed groups ever accused your organisation of partiality? If so, give details of the circumstances.
Has any armed groups ever used such accusations to justify any attacks against your staff/structures? If so, give details of the circumstances.
Are you in contact with any armed groups? Yes / No If so, specify the nature of the contact: • "Normal" physical contact (checkpoints, etc.): Yes / No • Physical contact initiated at your request: Yes / No • Telephone contact: Yes / No • Other types of contact:
Such contacts are made between you and … (select as many answers as necessary): • Military leaders of the groups: Yes / No • Political representatives (or spokespersons) of the groups: Yes / No • Rank-and-file: Yes / No • Other (specify):
Do you have any difficulty speaking to any groups? If so, name the groups concerned and the reasons why (refusal by them, difficulty identifying representatives, etc.).
Is your programme affected by taxes, pillaging and any other similar activities carried out by these groups?
What is the nature of your relations with FARDC representatives?
Do the armed groups operating in your area of intervention influence the local staff you recruit (in particular: geographical, ethnic or social origin; any links to the groups, etc.)? If so, how does it affect your choice?
Free expression: provide any additional information, thoughts or suggestions that you have not already mentioned above, which you deem may be useful to this survey.

INTERNATIONAL NGO SAFETY ORGANISATION
Analysis & Advice for Humanitarians

Humanitarian Aid
and Civil Protection

Bukavu | Goma | Zurich
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(Photo: Landscape in North Kivu © Christoph Vogel 2012)

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Humanitarian Aid
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